C h i'ti  3 

Foi‘.  Ties 


CHINA’S  CLAIMS 

at  the 

PEACE  TABLE 


CHINA’S  CLAIMS 

at  the 

PEACE  TABLE 


Published  by 

CHINESE  PATRIOTIC  COMMITTEE 
New  York  City 


March.  1Q19 


''  \ ' A •• 


/ 


i 


-%■ 


/ 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 


A.  China  and  the  I.eague  of  Nations 5 

B.  China’s  Peace  Claims ii 

I.  The  Unconditional  Return  of  Kiao- 

Chou  II 

If.  The  Nullification  of  Chino-Japanese 
Treaties  of  1915  and  Secret  Agree- 
ments of  1918 18 

III.  The  Cancellation  of  Boxer  Indemnity.  27 

IV.  The  Restoration  of  TarifI  Autonomy  31 

V.  The  Relinquishment  of  Extra-Terri- 
torial Jurisdiction  36 

VI.  The  Retrocession  of  Leased  Terri- 
tories   44 

VII.  The  Abolition  of  Financial  Imperialism  48 


Summary 


59 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2017  with  funding  from 
Columbia  University  Libraries 


https://archive.org/details/chinasclaimsatpeOOchin_0 


CHINA  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 


Among  all  the  powers  of  the  world,  great  and  small, 
now  gathering  at  the  Paris  Conference,  China  en- 
dorses the  plan  of  the  League  of  Nations  most  unhesi- 
tatingly and  wholeheartedly.  Immediately  after  the 
announcement  of  the  proposed  League  Constitution, 
China,  throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  Re- 
public, entertains  hut  one  sentiment,  that,  hereafter  a 
new  order  of  nationalism  and  internationalism  based 
on  right  and  justice  is  to  reign  in  the  world,  and  by 
this  new  order,  China  hopes  to  get  an  honorable  place 
among  the  family  of  nations,  which  she  is  legally  and 
morally  entitled  to,  and  by  which  she  will  be  able  not 
only  to  realize  her  material  development  without  moles- 
tation from  outside,  but  also  to  render  greater  and  bet- 
ter services  to  mankind  at  large.  This  universal  senti- 
ment of  China  has  been  voiced  by  both  her  government 
and  people.  From  Peking  and  from  elsewhere,  cables 
of  congratulation  have  been  forwarded  to  President 
Wilson,  the  founder  of  the  League,  with  messages  of 
appreciation  and  pledges  of  support  for  the  newly 
organized  international  federation.  Dr.  V.  K.  Well- 
ington Koo,  one  of  China’s  delegates  at  Paris,  and  one 
of  the  members  on  the  committee  of  the  drafting  of 
the  League  Constitution,  has  repeatedly  declared 
China’s  strong  and  firm  stand  for  the  League,  in  the 
council  meetings  as  well  as  in  the  plenary  sessions. 
Why  does  China  have  such  an  undivided  and  over- 
whelming enthusiasm  and  faith  in  the  League  ? 

China  endorses  the  League  of  Nations,  because  she 
agrees  with  the  ideals  and  principles  involved,  in  her 
heart,  not  merely  in  words.  She  believes  in  intema- 


5 


tional  amity  and  good  will  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the 
term.  She  aspires  to  nothing  but  peace  and-friendship 
with  other  powers.  Militarism  and  imperialism  China 
dislikes  most,  for  they  are  alien  and  unknown  to  the 
democratic  mind  of  the  Chinese  people.  The  ethical 
code  for  international  relations  that  China  has  learned 
from  her  long-continuous  history  and  age-honored 
civilization  is  one  of  mutual  respect  and  unselfish 
cooperation  among  the  parties  concerned.  Friendly 
relations  should  always  be  maintained  one  nation  with 
another;  and  international  disputes  or  quarrels  if  any, 
should  always  be  settled  through  amicable  means.  Small 
and  weak  nations  should  be  left  unfettered  and  un- 
molested; and  a common  enemy  menacing  the  world 
peace  should  be  crushed  by  all  members  of  the  society 
of  nations,  through  diplomatic  channels,  if  possible,  and 
through  armed  demonstration  if  necessary.  Interna- 
tional rivalries  and  intrigues,  as  such,  have  never  been 
taught  by  China’s  old  teachers ; and  war  is  always 
against  the  moral  conception  of  Chinese  philosophy. 
In  these  ideals  and  principles  China,  as  a nation,  be- 
lieves from  time  immemorial;  and  in  these  ideals  and 
principles  the  League  of  Nations  promises  a permanent 
peace  of  the  world  for  the  ages  to  come.  This  coinci- 
dence of  fundamentals  makes  China’s  membership  in 
the  League  one  of  instinctive  affiliation  rather  than 
one  of  artificial  inclination. 

China,  as  a member  of  the  League,  has  a supreme 
duty  to  perform,  a duty  of  helping  the  realization  of 
ideals  and  principles,  for  which  both  she  herself  and 
the  League  stand.  First  and  foremost,  China  chooses 
to  appeal  to  the  liberal  world  for  a complete  readjust- 
ment of  the  Far  Eastern  status.  In  appealing  for  this 


6 


readjustment,  China  is  working  for  the  interests  of  the 
world  peace,  not  for  the  interest  of  herself  alone,  be- 
cause the  Far  Eastern  problem,  if  not  solved  now  once 
and  for  all,  would  cause  another  world  catastrophe  as 
disastrous  as  the  one  just  ended.  Ever  since  the  con- 
tact of  the  Orient  with  the  Occident,  the  Far  East  has 
been  a field  of  intrigues  and  rivalries  among  the  Euro- 
pean and  the  Europeanized  states ; and  China  has  been 
the  target  of  all  the  evil  forces  of  the  bye-gone  genera- 
tion. Non -militaristic  and  peace-loving  as  China  is,  she 
has  'been  mercilessly  treated  as  an  inexhausti- 
ble prey  of  “Secret  Treaties,”  “Spheres  of  Influence,” 
and  “Balance  of  Powers.”  The  history  of  the  Far 
Eastern  diplomacy  played  by  different  powers  con- 
tains dark  records  shameful  both  to  humanity  and 
civilization,  incompatible  either  with  Kultur,  or  with 
culture,  or  with  Bushido.  Not  for  one  day  during 
the  last  few  decades,  China  has  ceased  to  be  the  victim 
of  the  ever  condemnable  aspiration  known  as  imperial- 
ism, be  it  political,  economic,  religious,  or  otherwise, 
aspired  to  by  one  nation  or  another,  particularly  by  her 
Germanized  neighbor  in  late  years.  The  Far 'East  has 
thus  become  a centre  of  complicated  troubles.  In 
China  there  are  still  growing  conflicts  of  interests  and 
policies  of  different  nations ; these  conflicts  alone,  re- 
gardless of  the  natural  opposition  on  the  part  of  the 
Chinese,  would  be  enough  to  lead  into  another  world- 
wide bloody  struggle.  This,  however,  the  Peace 
delegates  at  Paris  are  seeking  to  avoid,  and  the  spirit 
of  the  League  does  not  allow. 

That  China  has  ample  justification  in  her  claim  of 
readjusting  her  relations  with  foreign  powers,  no  one 
will  deny.  But  will  the  European  and  the  European 


7 


states  consent  to  such  a readjustment  unconditionally? 
Surely  they  will,  if  not  for  the  sake  of  China,  then 
for  the  sake  of  the  newly  founded  League.  The 
League  of  Nations  will  be  absurd  and  meaningless 
if  it  will  tolerate  further  continuance  of  old  immoral 
as  well  as  impolitic  policies  practiced  by  the  powers  in 
the  Orient.  With  the  birth  of  the  League,  a new  era 
has  been  inaugurated.  The  age  of  imperialisim,  im- 
perialism of  any  description,  is  gone  forever.  China 
is  just  as  tired  of  her  humiliations  as  the  world  is 
tired  of  wars.  The  world  democracy  cries  for  the 
elimination  of  future  wars;  and  the  new  regime  of 
liberalism  calls  for  an  immediate  renunciation  of 
China’s  humiliations.  All  the  wrongs  that  China  has 
suffered  from  other  powers  during  the  last  century, 
and  for  which  she  herself  has  never  been  responsible, 
must  be  one  and  all  righted.  Before  the  League  of 
Nations  can  be  secure  and  before  China  can  become 
an  effective  and  efficient  member  of  the  League  her 
complete  sovereignty  and  independence  must  be  re- 
stored. Before  the  world  is  safe  for  democracy,  the 
Pacific  must  be  preserved  pacific.  In  this  appeal 
China  is  aiming,  neither  at  revenge  nor  at  her  own 
nationalistic  interest,  but  at  the  perfection  of  the 
League  ideals  and  principles  in  deeds  as  well  as  in 
letter.  She  is  sure  that  the  other  members  of  the 
League  will  share  her  aim,  which  is  common  to  all 
and  antagonistic  to  none. 

China  is  a nation  with  an  enormous  population  and 
unlimited  resources,  backed  up  by  a splendid  history 
and  advanced  civilization.  She  has  never  upheld  the 
selfish  ambition  of  taking  alone,  but  not  giving.  As 
one  of  the  members  of  the  League,  she  is  willing  to- 


8 


serve  the  world  any  way  possible,  either  toward  ma- 
terial progress  or  toward  spiritual  advancement. 
Materially  her  inexhaustible  resources  and  labor  will 
increase  the  comfort  and  luxury  of  every  nation ; and 
spiritually,  her  ancient  history  and  civilization  will 
contribute  intellectual  delightfulness  and  ethical 
wholesomeness  to  mankind.  She  has  been  expect- 
ing to  render  these  services  to  her  sister  nations  in 
return  for  her  debt  to  the  mo'dern  scientific  learning 
of  the  West,  but  she  has  never  been  given  a chance, 
for  every  step  she  moves  she  is  hampered  by  treaties 
or  concessions  with  one  polwer  or  another.  Unless 
China  is  left  free  to  manage  her  own  affairs,  the  ideal 
civilization  for  the  new  era  as  sought  by  the  League 
of  Nations  will  remain  only  as  a dream.  If  the 
League  of  Nations  is  to  mean  future  happiness  for 
mankind,  China’s  international  standing  must  be  re- 
vised, so  that  she  can  play  her  important  role  of  the 
League  programme  well. 

Unfortunately  or  fortunately,  China’s  case  should 
assume  such  an  importance  and  magnitude  at  Paris 
Conference.  Her  claims  at  the  Peace  Table  as  out- 
lined in  the  following  pages  should  not  be  overlooked. 
They  are  in  fact  the  crucial  tests  of  the  ideals  and 
principles  of  the  League  of  Nations.  The  success  or 
failure  of  the  League  depends  upon  the  solution  of 
the  Far  Eastern  question.  If  the  spirit  of  the  League 
is  to  be  applicable  to  China,  then  the  prospect  of  the 
new  regime  is  bright  and  safe.  If  China,  after  such 
a display  of  enthusiasm  and  faith  over  the  League 
plan,  is  to  be  disappointed  by  the  verdict  of  the  Con- 
ference, then  the  future  of  the  League  will  be 
very  much  in  doubt.  The  problem  of  the  Far  East  is 


9 


indeed  momentous.  Four  hundred  millions  of  peo- 
ple are  facing  a life  and  death  sentence  at  Paris ; and 
upon  this  sentence  the  fate  of  the  permanent  peace  of 
the  world  is  going  to  depend.  China  pleads  for  noth- 
ing but  fair  play  and  sound  judgment.  For  the  interest 
of  the  world  peace  and  for  the  interest  of  four  hun- 
dred millions  of  people  a death  sentence  should  not  be 
tolerated  by  the  enlightened  powers,  particularly  the 
United  States  of  America,  in  whom  China  has  deepest 
confidence  and  by  whom  the  upright  plan  of  the 
League  of  Nations  is  originated. 


10 


CHINA’S  PEACE  CLAIMS 

I.  The  Unconditional  Return  of  Kiao-Chou 

Kiao-Chou,  including  the  commercial  port  of  Tsing- 
tao,  is  an  integral  part  of  Chinese  territory.  It  is 
situated  on  the  southern  coast  of  Shantung  Province. 
The  Bay  of  Kiao-Chou,  together  with  the  port  of 
Tsingtao,  forms  one  of  the  finest  commercial  centres  of 
the  world'.  Kiao-tChou,  owing  to  its  promontories 
overlooking  the  Gulf  of  Chih-Li,  has  great  military 
and  naval  value,  both  for  offensive  and  defensive  pur- 
poses; and  from  Tsing-tao,  the  Kiao-Chou-Tsinan 
Railroad  controls  the  mainland  of  Shantung,  leading  to 
Chih-Li  Province  in  which  is  located  the  capital  of 
China,  Peking. 

Since  1898,  Kiao-Chou  has  been  leased  to  the  for- 
mer German  Government  for  99  years,  because  of  a 
trivial  murder  of  two  Catholic  missionaries  by  native 
Chinese.  Following  this  precedent,  one  nation  after 
another  came  to  China'for  territory ; the  lease  of  Kiao- 
Chou  thus  marked  the  beginning  of  dark  history  of  Far 
Eastern  diplomacy.  When  the  war  broke  out  in  Europe 
in  1914,  China,  seeing  the  opportunity  to  destroy  the 
miniature  of  German  Kultur  in  the  Orient,  established 
in  Kiao-Chou,  offered  to  declare  war  on  Germany ; but 
this  offer  was  refused  by  Japan,  and  by  Japan  alone, 
obviously  for  her  selfish  motives.  Instead,  the  Island 
Empire  demanded  Germany  to  withdraw  her  occupa- 
tion from  Kiao-Chou;  and  upon  failure  of  the  latter’s 
answer,  she,  with  the  help  of  British  military  and 
naval  forces,  crossed  neutral  territory  of  China  and 
captured  her  objective,  Kiao-Chou,  including  Tsing- 
tao, on  November  7,  1914.  Since  the  capture,  Japan 


has  been  Japanizing  the  territory  all  the  time.  She 
collected  the  customs  duty  from  the  port,  which  for 
the  four  years  has  run  up  to  tens  of  millions  of  dollars. 
She  replaced  German  administration,  with  methods 
and  systems  peculiarly  Japanese.  She  maintained  a 
large  army  and  a strong  fleet  in  Kiao-Chou,  which  was 
called  for  by  no  occasion.  She  has  sent  to  the  terri- 
tory thousands  of  Japanese  subjects,  representing  all 
kinds  of  petty  professions,  including  prostitution. 
Worse  than  that,  she  has  even  established  civil  ad- 
ministration and  military  stations  along  the  Kiao- 
Chou-Tsinan  Railroad,  outside  the  territory  of  Kiao- 
Chou,  which  the  Germans  never  dared  to  do.  In  spite 
of  numerous  protests  from  Chinese  Government  and 
people,  Japan  showed  little  willingness  to  modify  her 
policy  until  very  recently. 

On  the  day  when  Japan  sent  her  ultimatum  to  Ger- 
many in  August,  1914,  Count  Okuma,  then  the  Japa- 
nese Premier,  telegraphed  to  the  press  in  America, 
saying:  “Japan’s  proximity \ to  China  breeds  many 
absurd  rumors,  but  I declare  that  Japan  acts  with  a 
clear  conscience  in  conformity  with  justice,  and  in 
perfect  accord  with  her  ally.  Japan  has  no  territorial 
ambitions  and  hopes  to  stand  as  the  protector  of  the 
peace  in  the  Orient.’’  On  another  occasion  he  reiter- 
ated his  statement  as  follows : “As  Premier  of  Japan, 
I have  stated  and  I now  again  state  to  the  people  of 
America  and  of  the  world  that  Japan  has  no  ulterior 
motive,  no  desire  to  secure  more  territory,  no  thought 
of  depriving  China  or  other  people  of  anything  that 
they  now  possess.  My  Government  and  my  people 
have  given  their  pledge  which  will  be  as  honorably 
kept  as  Japan  always  keeps  promises.’’  Public  state- 


12 


ments  to  the  similar  effect  have  been  once  and  again 
issued  by  Japanese  governmental  officials.  Even  as 
late  as  January  21,  1919,  Viscount  Uchida,  the  Japa- 
nese Foreign  Minister,  told  the  world  through  his 
speech  in  Japanese  Parliament,  “It  goes  without  say- 
ing that  Japan  has  no  territorial  ambition  in  China  or 
elsewhere,  neither  does  she  contemplate  any  action 
which  might  militate  against  that  development  of  the 
legitimate  intent  and  welfare  of  the  Chinese  nation. 
We  have  solemnly  pledged  ourselves  to  respect  the 
territorial  integrity  of  China  and  to  abide  faithfully 
by  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  and  the  open 
door  for  commerce  and  industry.”  But  all  these  state- 
ments became  meaningless,  when  Premier  Kara 
answered  the  interpellation  in  the  Japanese  Diet  on 
February  21,  1919,  that  he  did  not  see  any  reason  for 
China  to  claim  the  restoration  of  Tsing-tao. 

While  the  Japanese  Premier  and  other  Japanese 
expansionists  fail  to  see  the  ground  of  China’s  claim, 
we  Chinese  fail  to  see  the  reasoning  of  Japanese  logic 
tinged  with  Teutonic  philosophy.  The  only  argu- 
ment that  the  Japanese  may  base  their  contentions 
that  they  have  the  right  to  keep  Kiao-Chou  and  Tsing- 
tao  as  their  own  is  deducted  from  the  following  treaty 
and  note  between  China  and  Japan. 

a.  Treaty  of  May  25,  1915,  respecting  the  Prov- 
ince of  Shantung:  Article  1.  The  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment agrees  to  give  full  assent  to  all  matters 
upon  which  the  Japanese  Government  may  here- 
after agree  with  the  German  Government  relating 
to  the  disposition  of  all  rights,  interests,  and  con- 
cessions which  Germany,  by  virtue  of  treaties  or 


13 


otherwise,  possess  in  relation  to  the  Province 
of  Shantung. 

b.  Exchange  6f  Notes  on  May  25,  1915,  respect- 
ing the  restoration  of  the  leased  territory  of  Kiao- 
Chou  Bay:  When,  after  the  termination  of  the 
present  war,  the  Leased  Territory  of  Kiao^Chou 
is  completely  left  to  the  free  disposal  of  Japan, 
the  Japanese  Government  will  restore  the  said 
leased  territory  to  China  under  the  following  con- 
ditions : 

1.  The  whole  of  Kiao-Chou  Bay  to  be  opened  as 
a commercial  port. 

2.  A concession  under  the  exclusive  jurisdiction 
of  Japan  to  be  established  at  a place  designated 
by  the  Japanese  Government. 

3.  If  the  powers  desire  it,  an  international  con- 
cession may  be  established. 

4.  As  regard  the  disposal  to  be  made  of  the  build- 
ings and  properties  of  Germany  and  the  condi- 
tions and  procedure  relating  thereto,  the  Japanese 
Government  and  the  Chinese  Government  shall 
arrange  the  matter  by  mutual  agreement  before 
the  restoration. 

This  treaty  and  note  were  signed  and  exchanged 
under  pressure  of  force.  Plainly  speaking,  they 
amount  to  the  old  philosophy — might  is  right.  By 
this  philosophy  Japan  maintains  that  by  virtue  of  her 
conquest  over  the  Germans  she  subsequently  succeeds 
the  enjoyment  of  all  German  rights  and  privileges  in 
Kiao-Chou  conceded  by  China  to  the  former  German 


14 


Government  through  treaty  or  otherwise.  She  fur- 
ther maintains  that  if  Kiao-Chou  is  to  be  returned  to 
China,  the  above  quoted  four  specified  conditions  must 
be  fulfilled  by  China. 

Against  these  contentions  China  maintains  the  fol- 
lowing : 

A.  Legally  Japan  has  no  justification  to  keep  Kiao- 
Chou.  China’s  declaration  of  war  on  Teutonic 
Powers  in  August,  1917,  abrogated  all  treaties  and 
agreements  existing  between  China  and  the  former 
German  Government,  and  automatically  terminated 
at  the  same  time  the  Chino-Japanese  Treaty  of  May 
25,  1915,  respecting  the  Province  of  Shantung.  Upon 
this  abrogation  and  termination  of  treaties  and  agree- 
ments, including  the  lease  of  Kiao-Chou,  China  is  the 
only  one  who  has  the  right  to  claim  back  all  interests 
and  privileges  conceded  to  the  former  German  Gov- 
ernment. The  mere  fact  that  Japan  captured  Kiao- 
Chou  from  'the  Germans  does  not  give  Japan  any  right 
of  succession  over  the  interests  and  privileges  en- 
joyed by  the  Germans  since  1898,  because  China 
signed  the  lease  with  Germany  alone,  and  with  nobody 
else.  Japan’s  occupation  in  Kiao-Chou  has  no  other 
legal  status  than  a military  occupation ; and  as  such  she 
has  no  right  to  retain  the  said  territory,  when  the  mili- 
tary necessity  ceases.  As  “a  sincere  friend  of  China,” 
as  “a  protector  of  the  peace  in  the  Far  East,”  and  as 
“an  upholder  of  international  law,”  as  Japan  is  used  to 
style  herself,  she  should  have  handed  over  to  China 
unconditionally  all  her  occupation  in  Shantung,  par- 
ticularly in  Kiao-Chou,  before  China  claims  for  the 
same.  For  compensation  of  the  campaign  of  Tsing- 
tao,  if  any  and  if  justifiable,  Japan  should  ask  for  that 


15 


from  the  Germans.  China  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
campaign,  and  thus  she  sustains  no  obligation  to  Japan 
whatsoever.  Japan  therefore  has  no  legal  justification 
in  retaining  Kiao-Chou  and  Tsing-tao,  and  China’s 
claim  for  the  restoration  of  the  same  is  therefore  in 
accordance  with  the  international  law. 

B.  Morally  Japan  has  no  right  to  keep  Kiao-Chou. 
One  of  the  established  principles  of  international  law 
regarding  the  termination  of  treaties  and  agreements 
is  that  when  a treaty  or  agreement  is  concluded  upon 
threat  of  force,  that  treaty  or  agreement  is  voidable. 
The  note  between  China  and  Japan  of  May  25,  1915, 
was  exchanged  after  the  same  threat  that  made  China 
yield  to  Japan’s  Twenty-One  Demands.  China  con- 
sented the  conditions  for  the  restoration  of  Kiao-Chou 
as  Japan  specified  them  in  the  above  quoted  note,  only 
because  of  the  pressure  of  that  threat.  If  these  speci- 
fied conditions  are  to  be  carried  out,  the  restoration  of 
Kiao-Chou  would  not  mean  anything  in  actual  fact. 
This  is  particularly  true  in  the  case  of  the  second 
condition,  which  says,  “a  concession  under  the  exclu- 
sive jurisdiction  of  Japan  to  be  established  at  a place 
designated  hy  the  Japanese  Government.”  What  does 
this  mean  ? The  “place”  Japan  has  in  mind  is  the 
port  of  Tsingtao,  the  best  of  all  naval  bases  on  Chinese 
coast.  In  other  words,  under  this  condition,  Japan 
would  try  to  deceive  the  world  as  well  as  to  deceive 
China,  hy  restoring  Kiao-Chou,  but  keeping  the  best 
part  of  the  territory  for  herself,  namely,  Tsing-tao. 
The  fulfilment  of  this  condition,  China  will  never  con- 
sent, and  the  world  should  never  permit,  for  Japanese 
occupation  of  Tsing-tao  will  not  only  impare  China’s 
territorial  integrity,  but  also  shut  off  equal  opportunity 

16 


of  commerce  and  industry  that  other  nations  have 
the  right  to  share  in  the  Province  of  Shantung.  Thus 
the  restoration  of  Kiao-Chou  would  not  be  complete 
until  every  part  of  the  territory  of  Kiao-Chou,  Tsing- 
tao  not  excepted,  is  turned  over  to  China.  The  master 
stroke  of  deceipt  of  Japan  exemplihed  in  the  specified 
conditions  should  be  condemned,  and  Japan  must  be 
made  to  live  up  to  her  own  words,  “Japan  has  no  terri- 
torial ambition  in  China  or  elsewhere.”  In  the  spirit 
of  the  ideals  and  principles  that  the  League  of  Nations 
stands  for,  we  Chinese  therefore  claim  that  the  note 
exchanged  on  May  25,  1915,  should  be  made  null  and 
void,  and  the  entire  territory  of  Kiao-Chou  should 
be  restored  to  China  without  any  conditions  attached 
whatsoever. 

Incidental  to  the  claim  for  the  restoration  of  Kiao- 
Chou,  we  further  appeal  to  the  enlightened  Powers 
sitting  at  Paris  for  fair  judgment  on  the  problems  set 
forth  below.  In  carrying  out  the  campaign  of  Tsing- 
tao,  Japan  violated  the  neutrality  of  China.  She  was 
attacking  her  enemy  in  a third  neutral  country.  The 
initemational  law  has  never  allowed  such  a violation 
of  neutrality.  No  provision  in  the  law  will  justify 
Japan’s  action,  and  Japan  must  be  duly  punished  for 
this  violation.  The  campaign  of  Tsing-tao  lasted  for 
about  three  months,  during  which  China  suffered 
losses  of  life  and  property  in  the  territory  where  the 
battle  was  fought.  Justice  should  provide  compen- 
sation for  China.  Since  the  German  withdrawal  from 
Kiao-Chou,  Japan  has  exacted  from  the  customs  duty 
an  amount  far  exceeding  the  actual  expenses  of  the 
campaign.  If  the  international  law  is  to  be  upheld, 


17 


China  Is  entitled  for  a favorable  adjustment  of  this 
customs  receipt  with  Japan. 

China  therefore  has  ample  justification,  both  le- 
gally and  morally,  to  claim  for  the  restoration  of 
Kiao-Chou,  and  for  the  adjustment  of  the  incidental 
problems.  To  this  justifiable  claim  of  China,  the 
Peace  Conference  should  not  deny.  If  Japan  is  to 
get  what  she  wants,  then  the  war  would  be  fought  in 
vain,  and  the  League  of  Nations  would  be  nothing  but 
words. 

II.  The  Nullification  of  the  Chino-Japanese 
Treaties  of  1915  and  the  Secret 
Agreements  of  1918 

o.  The  Treaties  of  1915. 

We  demand  the  nullification  of  the  Chino-Japanese 
treaties  of  1915  on  three  grounds.  First,  because 
they  were  made  imder  duress  and  ^threat.  Second, 
because  they  impair  China’s  independence.  Third, 
because  they  are  a menace  to  the  future  peace  of  the 
world. 

As  to  the  first,  little  need  be  said  than  stating 
briefly  how  these  treaties  came  about.  As  the  world 
knows,  the  Chino-Japanese  treaties  of  1915  are  re- 
sults of  the  notorious  Twenty-One  Demands  presented 
to  China  by  Japan  on  January  18,  1915,  for  the  pur- 
pose, as  the  opening  sentence  of  the  Japanese  demands 
declared,  “of  maintaining  the  general  peace  in 
Eastern  Asia  and  further  strengthening  the  friend- 
ly relations  and  good  neighborhood  existing  between 
the  two  nations.”  Of  course  we  need  not  wonder 
whether  the  general  peace  in  Eastern  Asia  was  in  any 

18 


way  endangered  or  whether  the  friendly  relations  be- 
tween the  two  nations  needed  such  an  extra  strength- 
ening. In  plain  words,  Japan  simply  coveted  the 
things  embodied  in  her  21  demands.  The  European 
powers  were  breathlessly  engaged  in  fighting  German 
militarism,-  America  also  focussed  her  attention  on 
the  battlefield  of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  Every- 
body was  busy  save  Japan.  It  was  a God-sent  chance 
for  Great  Nippon.  The  “ten  thousand  years”  had 
come  and  must  not  let  pass.  Accordingly,  Japan  pre- 
sented her  21  demands  to  China.  She  presented  them 
with  a warning  that  the  matter  must  be  kept  secret 
and  that  if  it  should  be  known  to  the  world  China 
must  suffer  the  consequences  for  it.  China,  bullied 
and  helpless,  obeyed  the  order  of  her  neighbor,  who 
sought  to  strengthen  “the  friendly  relations”  with  her. 
Therefore  the  matter  was  not  known  to  the  outside 
world  until  many  weeks  after,  when  finally  the  news 
through  some  way  leaked  out.  Then  the  nation  was 
alarmed  and  the  world  bewildered.  But  Japan  stood 
firm  and  pressed  her  demands  ever  resolutely.  The 
Chinese  government,  seeing  it  impossible  to  escape 
the  designed  blow,  agreed  to  15  of  the  21  demands, 
pleading  that  the  other  6 being  of  a nature  violating 
her  sovereign  rights  she  “felt  difficult  to  accept.”  In 
order  to  show  her  determination,  Japan  changed  on 
April  26  the  original  21  demands  into  24.  China  was 
sitill  unyielding  and  the  negotiations  lasted  another 
three  weeks.  Then,  on  May  7,  under  a clear  sky,  the 
Japanese-  Minister  at  Peking  handed  to  the  Chinese 
President  an  ultimatum,  which  stated  thalt  with  the 
exception  of  Group  V Japan  expected  China  to  ac- 


19 


cept  unconditionally  all  the  demands  within  48  hours. 
The  last  sentences  of  the  ultimatum  read : 

“The  Imperial  Government  hereby  offer  their 
advice  and  hope  thait  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, upon  this  advice,  will  give  satisfactory 
reply  by  6 o’clock  p.m.  on  the  9th  day  of 
May.  It  is  hereby  declared  that  if  no  satis- 
factory reply  is  received  before  or  at  the 
specified  time  the  Imperial  Government  will 
take  such  steps  as  they  may  deem  necessary.” 

Meanwhile,  the  Japanese  warships  had  already  been 
dispatched  to  Chinese  waters  and  Japanese  troops 
were  under  orders  for  action.  Japan  thus  decided 
to  teach  China  her  national  religion  that  might  is 
right.  China,  being  a peaceful  nation  and  in  no  con- 
dition to  test  the  prowess  of  the  Sunrise  Kingdom, 
bowed,  as  the  events  proved,  to  the  inevitable  and 
yielded  unconditionally  to  the  Asiatic  Prussia.  Then 
followed  the  exchanges  of  notes  making  the  interpre- 
tation of  the  terms  still  unbearable  to  a nation  already 
humiliated;  the  treaties  were  concluded  on  May  25, 

1915- 

This  is  the  origin  of  the  Chino- Japanese  treaties  of 
1915.  They  were  forced  upon  China.  They  have 
no  validity  in  a time  when  we  say  “might  does  not 
make  right.”  The  treaties  of  Brest-Litovsk  and  Buda- 
pest have  been  annulled  because  they  were  made 
under  duress.  Yet  Russia  and  Rumania  had  been  at 
war  with  Germany  and  the  tre-aties  were  natural  con- 
sequences of  a lost  war.  But  China  was  innocent  and 
gave  Japan  no  provocation.  Compare  the  two  sets  of 
unprovoking  to  Japan.  Compare  the  two  sets  of 

?Q 


treaties,  one  will  be  convinced  that  Germany,  ruthless 
as  she  was,  still  showed  more  leniency  toward  Russia 
and  Rumania  than  Japan  toward  China.  Can  there  be 
any  slightest  reason  that  Nippon  should  not  follow 
the  example  of  Deutchland? 

In  the  second  place,  Japan  should  not  be  allowed 
to  retain  her  booty  of  1915  because  the  treaties  con- 
cluded seriously  impair  China’s  existence  as  an  in- 
dependent nation.  To  be  true  to  fact,  let  us  examine 
some  of  the  most  important  terms  of  the  treaties. 

Article  I of  the  Treaty  respecting  Shantung  de- 
clares : “The  Chinese  Government  agrees  to  give  full 
assent  to  all  matters  upon  which  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment may  hereafter  agree  with  the  German  Gov- 
ernment relating  to  the  disposition  of  all  rights,  in- 
terests, and  concessions  which  Germany,  by  virtue  of 
treaties  or  otherwise,  possesses  in  relation  to  the  Prov- 
ince of  Shantung.”  This  eliminates  China’s  sovereign 
rights  from  that  province  and  makes  it  a pawn  be- 
tween Japan  and  Germany.  If  Germany  had  no  right 
in  the  home  land  of  Confucius,  then  what  right  has 
Japan?  Furthermore,  the  same  treaty  stipulates  that 
when  China  wants  to  build  a certain  railroad  in  the 
Province  of  Shantung,  she  shall  approach  the  Japanese 
capitalists  first  to  negotiate  for  a loan.  This  is  not 
different  from  saying  that  the  railroad  must  be  built  by 
Japan. 

Article  i of  the  Treaty  repecting  South  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  declares  that  the 
terms  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dairen  and  the 
terms  of  the  South  Manchurian  Railway  and  the  An- 
tung-Mukden  Railway  shall  be  extended  to  99  years. 
The  term  “99  years”  is  simply  a pleasant  substitute 


21 


for  perpetual  ownership.  Articles  2,  3,  4,  and  5 of  the 
same  treaty  provide  that  Japanese  subjects  in  South 
Manchuria  shall  have  the  right  to  reside,  travel,  and 
“engage  in  business  and  manufacture  of  any  kind 
whatsoever”  freely  and  that  in  civil  and  criminal  cases 
in  which  the  defendants  are  Japanese,  they  shall  be 
tried  and  adjudicated,  not  by  Chinese  court,  but  by 
Japanese  consul.  It  can  be  easily  inferred  from  these 
provisions  that  Japan  can  manufacture  munitions  and 
implements  of  war  against  China  even  within  the  very 
borders  of  China  herself  and  yet  with  perfect  im- 
munity. 

In  the  subsequent  exchanges  of  notes,  China  is 
obliged  to  negotiate  loans  with  Japanese  capitalists 
first  when  she  wants  to  build  railways  with  foreign 
capital  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia or  when  she  wants  to  make  loans  on  the  security 
of  the  taxes  in  the  above-mentioned  places.  Moreover, 
if  foreign  advisers  or  instructors  on  political,  financial, 
military,  or  police  matters  are  to  be  employed,  Japanese 
have  the  right  of  preference.  Inasmuch  as  China 
needs  the  assistance  of  foreign  capital  in  building  rail- 
ways and  inasmuch  as  China  often  employs  foreign 
advisers  for  purposes  of  internal  reform,  these  pro- 
visions practically  give  Japan  complete  control  over 
these  provinces  and  reduce  China’s  sovereignty  to  a 
mere  fiction. 

What  is  more  astonishing  is  the  stipulation  re- 
specting the  Hanyehping  Iron  and  Coal  Company, 
China’s  largest  iron  works.  The  clause  regarding  this 
reads : 

“If  in  future  the  Hanyehping  Company  and 

the  Japanese  capitalists  agree  upon  co-opera- 


tiorij  the  Chinese  Government,  in  view  of  the 
intimate  relations  subsisting  between  the  Jap- 
anese capitalists  and  the  said  Company,  will 
forthwith  give  its  permission.  The  Chinese 
Government  further  agrees  not  to  confiscate 
the  said  Company,  nor  without  the  consent  of 
the  Japanese  capitalists  to  convert  it  into  a 
state  enterprise,  nor  cause  it  to  borrow  and 
use  foreign  capital  other  than  Japanese.” 

The  Hanyehping  Company  is  China’s  only  iron  work 
worth  mentioning  and  had  been  hitherto  under  the 
control  of  the  Chinese.  By  this  agreement,  the  con- 
trol, needless  to  say,  has  been  transferred  from  Peking 
to  Tokyo. 

So  far  we  have  just  reviewed  the  circumstances 
under  which  these  treaties  were  made  and  the  nature 
of  the  treaties,  which  is  absolutely  incompatible  with 
China’s  sovereign  rights.  Now  let  us  turn  to  the  third 
phase  of  the  question,  namely,  the  treaties  as  a menace 
to  the  future  peace  of  the  world. 

These  treaties  are  a menace  to  the  future  peace  of 
the  world  in  two  ways.  Firsit,  the  recognition  of  these 
treaties  is  a direct  sanction  of  imperialism  and  will 
invite  further  conflicts  among  those  nations  which 
have  interest  in  the  Far  East.  Balance  of  power  will 
again  come  into  play.  Spheres  of  influence  will  be 
resuscitated  with  additional  vigor.  The  natural  re- 
siult  will  be  inevitably  a clash  of  arms  and  the  world 
will  be  set  on  fire  again.  Secondly,  the  Chinese 
people  will  not  stand  these  iniquities.  They 
have  awakened  to  the  new  meaning  of  life;  they 
want  to  manage  their  national  affairs  by  them- 
selves, as  they  have  done  so  for  thousands  of 


23 


years.  An  imposed  master,  from  whatever  source  and 
for  whatever  purpose,  not  only  will  be  refused  but 
will  soon  meet  his  fate.  We  are  tired  of  abject  sub- 
mission and  will  tolerate  no  more  wrongs.  The  es- 
tablishment of  the  Republic  was  the  first  sign  of 
China’s  decision  to  become  a modern  power.  The 
record  of  the  last  seven  years  is  a strong  proof  of  the 
nation’s  determination  to  march  on  the  road  of  prog- 
ress with  other  nations  and  nothing  can  stand  iii  its 
way.  Yuan  Shih-kai’s  imperial  dream  proved  a fiasco 
and  Chang  Hsun’s  attempt  to  restore  the  boy  emperor 
resulted  in  a farce.  The  Civil  War  of  last  year  was  a 
more  vigorous  manifestation  of  the  nation’s  sense  of 
justice  and  right.  In  short,  the  age  of  toleration  of 
injustice  has  gone  and  the  Chinese  people  know  this. 
When  the  rest  of  the  world  is  fighting  for  justice,  China 
can  not  allow  herself  to  be  a criminal  by  tolerating 
injustice.  Intrigue  and  design,  as  such,  we  will  re- 
sist at  any  cost. 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  is  obvious  to  every 
fair-minded  person  that  for  the  promotion  of  justice, 
for  China’s  national  existence,  and  for  the  future  peace 
of  the  world,  the  Chino- Japanese  Treaties  of  1915 
should  be  condemned  and  nullified.  We  are  Siure  the 
enlightened  people  of  the  world  will  echo  our  appeal 
with  sympathy  and  support. 

b.  The  Secret  Agreements  of  1918 

There  are  about  eighty  secret  agreements  between 
China  and  Japan;  many  of  them  are  known  only 
to  the  men  who  negotiated  them.  But  those  we 
know  may  be  divided  into  two  classes.  One  is 


24 


the  Agreements  relating  to  the  Chino- Japanese  Mili- 
tary Convention  of  May,  1918,  and  the  other  the  three 
sets  of  notes  exchanged  on  September  24,  1918.  The 
latter  have  been  recently  published  by  the  Chinese 
delegates  to  the  Peace  Conference,  but  the  former 
still  waits  to  be  disclosed.  When,  a month  ago  it 
was  first  reported  that  the  Chinese  delegates  to 
the  Peace  Conference  would  disclose  the  secret 
treaties  imposed  upon  China  by  Japan,  the  Japanese 
Minister  at  Peking  warned  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment that  should  the  Chinese  delegates  choose  to 
do  so,  Japan  would  exert  her  financial  pressure  on 
China.  The  Minister  from  the  Island  Empire  also 
informed  the  Chinese  Government  that  “no  help  from 
outside  could  be  expected  because  while  Great  Britain 
was  engrossed  in  her  internal  disturbances,  Japan  had 
an  unemployed  army  and  navy.”  Despite  the  audacity 
of  the  Chinese  delegates  in  revealing  some  of  the  secret 
agreements,  obviously  the  threat  of  the  “unemployed 
army  and  navy”  served  its  purpose. 

Nevertheless,  the  Agreements  of  May,  1918, 
though  unpublished,  are  not  altogether  unknown  to 
the  public.  The  Chinese  newspapers  some  time  ago 
gave  out  the  general  nature  of  them  and  a recent 
despatch  from  London,  published  in  a New  York 
newspaper  [on  February  13,  confirmed  the  report  of 
the  Chinese  press.  Briefly  stated,  the  most  important 
terms  of  the  Agreements  relating  to  the  Chino- 
Japanese  Military  Convention  of  May,  1918,  are  as 
follows ; 

I.  China  to  recognize  Japan’s  preponderating 
influence  in  the  Orient  and  call  Japan’s  police 
power  to  suppress  the  disorder  in  the  Southern 
Chinese  provinces. 


25 


2.  China  to  employ  Japanese  arsenal  direc- 
tors and  purchase  all  arsenal  appliances  from 
Japan. 

3.  China  to  make  no  further  foreign  loans 
without  consulting  Japan. 

4.  China  to  grant  no  further  railway  conces- 
sions to  foreigners  without  consultation  with  and 
permission  of  Japan. 

What  do  these  terms  amount  to?  Are  they  anything 
less  than  financial  and  military  control  of  China  by 
Japan?  If  so,  is  China  still  an  independent  nation  of 
a Japanese  colony?  Or,  better,  is  there  any  China  left 
at  all? 

Drastic  as  the  provisions  of  the  Military  Con- 
vention are,  the  notes  exchanged  on  September  24, 
1918,  are  not  next  to  them  in  their  insidious  design. 
The  first  set  of  tliese  notes  gives  the  Japanese  capi- 
talists the  privilege  of  financing  the  railways  to  be 
built  first,  between  Kaiyuan,  Hailung,  and  Kirin;  sec- 
ond, between  Changchun  and  Taonan ; and  third,  from 
a point  between  Taonan  and  Jehol  to  some  seaport. 
The  total  distance  of  these  railways  is  over  600  miles. 
The  plan  is,  of  course,  to  consolidate  and  strengthen 
Japan’s  position  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia,  both 
politically  and  militarily. 

The  second  set  of  these  notes  deals  with  the  ad- 
ministration of  Shantung,  over  which  Japan  poses  as 
an  over-lord.  According  to  the  disclosed  documents, 
Japan  is  to  concentrate  her  troops  at  Tsing-tao,  with 
a contingent  stationed  at  Tsinan,  the  capital  of  Shan- 
tung, and  Japanese  are  “to  be  employed  at  the  head- 
quarters of  'tlie  police  force,  the  principal  railway  sta- 
tions, and  the  training  stations  of  the  police  force.” 
The  concentration  of  Japanese  troops  at  Tsing-tao,  to- 


26 


gether  with  the  employment  of  Japanese  police  force 
in  Shantung,  is  for  a military  purpose,  not  in  Shan- 
tung, but  beyond  it.  Shantung,  Japan  thinks,  is  al- 
ready her  own;  she  now  looks  farther.  This  project 
will  be  seen  in  a clear  light  when  we  examine  the 
third  set  of  these  secret  notes. 

The  third  set  of  these  notes  is  a more  thorough 
and  audacious  project  of  Japan’s  attempt  to  conquer 
China.  It  gives  Japan  the  right  to  build  railways; 
first,  from  Kaomi,  twenty  miles  west  of  Tsing-tao, 
running  southwest  to  Suchow,  about  250  miles,  con- 
necting with  the  railway  from  Lanchow,  in  Kansu 
Province,  to  the  sea;  and  second,  from  Tsinan,  in 
Shantung  Province  directly  west  to  Shunteh,  a dis- 
tance of  about  150  miles.  This  would  connect  with 
the  railway  operating  from  Peking  to  Hankow,  on  the 
Yang-tze  River,  and  connect  Tsing-tao  with  all  the 
important  railways  in  North  China.  With  militar}.’ 
headquarters  established  at  Tsing-tao  and  with  all  the 
strategic  railways  in  control,  Japan  is  ready  to  over- 
run all  China,  north  and  south.  What  a masterful 
scheme ! 

China  will  surely  become  a Japanese  province  if 
these  secret  agreementts  are  not  made  null  and  void. 
Besides,  secret  agreements  are  in  direct  contradiction 
with  the  principle  of  “open  covenants.”  If  the  League 
of  Nations  is  not  to  be  built  on  sand,  all  secret  agree- 
ments of  whatever  kind  must  meet  their  proper  fate. 

* III.  The  Cancellation  of  the  Boxer  Indemnity 

It  was  in  the  year  1898 — 20  years  from  today — on 
account  of  the  murder  of  two  Roman  Catholic  priests, 
Germany  seized  Kiao-Chou.  In  the  same  year  Russia 


27 


pounced  upon  Port  Arthur  and  Talien-Wan — all  these 
the  strategic  bases  of  China.  Following  suit,  Great 
Britain  took  the  lease  of  Wei-haFwai. 

This  rapid  spoliation  of  the  Chinese  territory 
aroused  the  patriotism  of  the  Boxers.  Ignorant  and 
yet  daring,  they  started  the  anti-foreign  movement. 
The  Manchu  Empress  Dowager,  who,  chafing  under 
the  iron  heels  of  the  powers,  was  only  too  glad  to  find 
an  ally  for  her  bigoted  vindication  of  the  Chinese 
sovereignty. 

The  sad  events  that  occurred  in  1900  need  no  com- 
ment here.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  throughout  the  tragic 
episode,  the  uprising  was  confined  to  the  districts 
around  Peking,  and  that  the  great  majority  of  the 
Chinese  had  no  part  whatever  in  the  fanatic  project. 
The  most  enlightened  viceroys,  like  Yuan  Shi  Kai  and 
L'u  Kwan  I,  refused  to  obey  the  secret  orders  of  the 
Empress  Dowager  to  kill  all  the  foreigners,  but  on  the 
contrary  gave  protection  to  them.  The  outbreak  itself 
never  spread  beyond  the  south  of  the  Yellow  River. 

Not  only  the  great  majority  of  the  Chinese  did 
not  have  any  share  in  the  uprising,  but  on  the  con- 
trary they  stoutly  opposed  such  suicidal  project. 
When  the  outbreak  was  in  its  full  swing,  they  were  un- 
able to  exert  their  will,  for  then  the  Manchu  regime 
was  a pure  autocracy,  over  which  the  Chinese  had  no 
control.  But  after  the  outbreak,  especially  when  they 
had  learned  the  bitter  lessons  of  humiliation,  they 
gradually  began  to  realize  that  the  bigoted  Manchu 
regime  which  had  instigated  the  uprising  must  not 
be  allowed  any  longer  to  pilot  the  ship  of  state,  and 
they  expressed  their  conviction  in  the  Revolution  ^of 
1911,  which  resulted  in  the  downfall  of  the  Manchu 


28 


Dynasity.  In  its  place  they  inaugurated  the  new  re- 
gime of  the  Chinese  Republic,  which  portended  a new 
foreign  policy — “peace  on  earth  and  good  will  toward 
all.” 

Such  is  the  background  of  the  case.  From  this,  we 
can  see  that  the  Boxer  Uprising  was  not  a concerted 
action  of  the  Chinese,  but  rather  the  fanatic  project  of 
the  autocratic  Manchu  rulers  and  ignorant  officials. 
The  majority  of  the  Chinese  people  did  not  take  part 
in  the  movement.  They  were  its  opponents.  And  yet 
when  the  trouble  was  over,  the  whole  country  was 
made  to  pay  to  the  powers  an  indemnity  of  $350,000,- 
000  with  compound  interest  to  be  paid  in  annual  instal- 
ments from  1901  to  1940.  The  following  is  the  table 
showing  the  manner  in  which  the  indemnity  was 
divided  to  different  powers : 


Power 

Proportion 

Haiknan 

Foreign 

(per  cent) 

Taels 

Currency 

Germany  . . . 

.20.015 

67 

90,070,515 

Mks. 

278,166,423.93 

Austria-Hung. 

.889 

76 

4,003,920 

Kr. 

10,394,092.40 

Belgium  

. 1, 88s 

41 

8,484,345 

Fr. 

31,816,293.75 

Spain  

. .030 

07 

135,315 

Ps. 

507,431.25 

United  States.  7.319 

79 

32,939,055 

Dol. 

24,440,778.81 

France  

.15750 

72 

70,878,240 

Fr. 

265,793,400.00 

Great  Britain 

.11,249 

01 

50,620,545 

£ 

7,593,080.19 

Portugal  

. .020 

50 

92,250 

£ 

13.837.17 

Italy  

• 5.914 

89 

26,617,005 

lire 

99,803,768.75 

Japan  

• 7731 

80 

34,793,100 

Yen 

48,950,891.70 

Holland  

. .173 

80 

782,100 

Fi. 

1,404,651.60 

Russia  

, .28.971 

36 

130,371,120 

Rou. 

180,084,021.44 

Norway  &.  Sw.  .013 

96 

62,820 

£ 

9,423.00 

Sundry  

. 033 

26 

149,870 

£ 

22,450.10 

This  big  sum  of  indemnity  has  been  a tremendous 
burden  on  the  Chinese  people.  It  destroys  the  eco- 
nomic strength  of  China.  It  has  been  imposed  on 
China  far  beyond  the  actual  damages  done  to  the 
powers,  and  costs  of  the  expedition.  And  yet  in  spite 


29 


of  financial  stringencies  and  political  disturbances 
existed  in  China  during  the  last  fifteen  years,  China 
has  always  met  her  obligations  faithfully.  The  instal- 
ments were  regularly  paid  whenever  they  were  due. 

That  justice  should  demand  the  remission  of  the 
excessive  amount  of  the  indemnity  none  will  deny. 
The  remission  of  $10,785,286.12  to  China  in  1908  by 
the  United  States  is  an  upright  example,  and  has  since 
created  an  unspeakable  good  will  in  China.  This  good 
will,  however,  should  not  be  enjoyed  by  the  United 
States  alone. 

As  soon  as  China  declared  war  on  the  Central 
Powers  in  August,  1917,  the  unpaid  portions  of  the 
indemnity  due  to  Germany  and  Austria-Himgary  were 
automatically  cancelled.  But  the  outstanding  sum  due 
to  the  other  powers  is  still  enormous,  about  $560,- 
000,000  in  total.  Although  the  payment  has  been  post- 
poned for  five  years  since  China’s  participation  in  the 
war,  yet  mere  postponement  does  not  mean  that  the 
powers  have  done  full  justice  to  China.  China  wants 
a total  cancellation  of  the  outstanding  sum,  which 
would  help  her  greatly  in  her  internal  development. 

China  will  not  feel  grateful  to  the  powers,  how- 
ever, if  they  would  remit  the  remaining  sum  to  her 
conditionally,  as  Japan  has  tried.  Last  September, 
Japan  proposed  to  return  the  indemnity.  But  her  pro- 
posal was  strongly  refused  by  China,  because  of  the 
onerous  terms  attached.  These  terms  were,  (i)  A 
Japanese  adviser  should  be  allowed  to  be  present  at 
conferences  of  Chinese  cabinet  for  considering  pro- 
posals to  be  submitted  by  the  Chinese  government  at 
the  Peace  Conference.  (2)  Prior  to  the  end  of  the 


30 


European  War,  China  shall  not  borrow  money  from 
any  other  country  to  return  loans  contracted  from 
Japan  and  cancel  the  loan  agreements.  (3)  Japan’s 
direction  of  the  use  of  the  indemnity  fund  and  her  sub- 
sequent control  of  the  exports  of  China’s  iron,  cotton, 
and  wool  products.  Any  terms  like  these,  backed  up 
by  sinister  motives,  China  will  never  welcome. 

Therefore  it  is  the  unconditional  cancellation  that 
China  is  appealing  for.  The  money  belongs  to  China ; 
she  wants  free  right  to  dispose  the  same  for  whatever 
purpose  she  likes  to.  Conditions  of  any  sort  would 
impair  her  sovereign  rights.  It  has  been  decided, 
however,  by  the  Chinese  Government  that  the  indem- 
nity fund,  when  returned,  will  be  used  for  her  internal 
development,  especially  along  education  lines.  With 
this  decision,  the  powers  are  assured  that  the  cancella- 
tion of  the  indemnity  will  do  greatest  good  to  China. 
Why  do  not  the  powers  follow  the  glorious  example 
of  the  United  States  and  remit  the  unpaid  part  of  the 
indemnity  to  China?  This  generosity  on  the  part  of 
the  powers  will  surely  create  good  will  among  the 
Chinese  who  opposed  the  Boxer  Uprising  but  have 
been  compelled  to  bear  the  responsibilitity  for  the 
penalty  therefor. 

IV.  The  Restoration  of  Tariff  Autonomy 

The  existing  conventional  tariff  in  China  is  also 
one  of  the  most  serious  of  the  grievances  that  China 
appeals  the  Peace  Conference  for  rectification.  Broad- 
ly speaking,  there  are  two  kinds  of  tariff — the  statutory 
tariff  and  the  conventional  tariff.  Statutory  tariff  is 
regulated  by  the  legislation  of  a state  without  outside 


31 


interference  and  is  based  on  the  right  of  taxation  en- 
joyed by  all  sovereign  states.  Such  a tariff  is  elastic 
and  may  be  utilized  for  revenue,  for  the  protection  of 
infant  industries,  or  for  furthering  the  political  and 
economic  interests  of  a state  through  reciprocal  or 
preferential  arrangements.  A convential  tariff,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  established  by  treaties  with  other  coun- 
tries. It  is  inelastic  and  carried  with  it  none  of  the 
advantages  of  the  other  system.  It  is  this  conven- 
tional tariff  system  which  is  in  force  in  China  at  the 
present  time. 

The  history  of  China’s  tariff  may  be  briefly  stated. 
It  was  in  the  year  1842  when  China  sustained  a crush- 
ing defeat  at  the  hands  of  the  British  because  of  trade 
disputes  that  China  was  forced  to  agree  not  to  levy 
a tariff  exceeding  five  per  cent  ad  valorem  on  imported 
and  exported  goods.  It  is  further  stipulated  in  the 
Nanking  Treaty  of  1842  that  the  tariff  rate  is  to  be 
uniform  and  not  to  be  changed  without  the  previous 
consent  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties.  Through 
the  operation  of  the  so-called  “most-favored-nation” 
clause  whereby  a privilege  granted  to  one  nation  is 
automatically  extended  to  other  nations,  this  conven- 
tional tariff  has  come  to  be  applied  to  goods  imported 
from  all  foreign  countries  that  have  treaty  relations 
with  China. 

The  Nanking  Treaty  of  1842  which  compelled 
China  to  adopt  a conventional  tariff  was  somewhat 
modified  by  the  Mackay  Treaty  concluded  between 
Great  Britain  and  China  in  1902.  In  that  treaty  Great 
Britain  agrees  that  China  should  have  the  right  to  levy 
a surtax  of  per  cent  on  imported  goods 

upon  the  fulfillment  of  the  following  conditions ; 


32 


(i)  if  the  likin  is  to  be  abolished,  (2)  if  all  “most- 
favored-nations”  should  join  in  the  understanding,  and 
(3)  if  their  assent  were  not  to  depend  on  “any  politi- 
cal concession  or  any  exclusive  commercial  conces- 
sion.” This  Mackay  Treaty  farther  provides  for  a 
complete  revision  of  the  tariff  at  the  end  of  ten  years. 
In  1912  the  question  of  revision  was  brought  up  but 
nothing  was  accomplished.  In  August,  1917;  after 
China  had  declared  war  on  Germany,  the  Allied  pow- 
ers were  pursuaded  to  agree  to  the  raising  of  the 
tariff  to  an  effective  5 per  cent.  This  was  absolutely 
necessary  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  tariff  *then 
existing  was  fixed  in  1902,  and  that  since  1902  the 
price  of  commodities  has  been  considerably  increased. 

Such  is  a brief  history  of  the  conventional  tariff 
in  China.  Our  next  step  is  to  inquire  into  the  main 
features  of  the  system.  In  the  first  place  the  con- 
ventional tariff"  provides  for  a uniform  rate  of  five 
per  cent  on  imported  and  exported  goods.  It  does 
not  distinguish  raw  materials  from  manufactured 
goods  nor  luxuries  from  necessities.  Consequently 
it  fails  to  do  justice  to  the  poor  people  who  have  to 
depend  for  their  existence  upon  the  necessities  and 
it  affords  no  protection  for  infant  industries  which 
are  just  developing  in  the  country.  This  arrange- 
ment is  very  unfortunate,  for  an  import  duty  is  but 
a tax  on  consumption  and  as  such  should  be  justly 
distributed.  To  levy  an  uniform  tax  on  both  neces- 
sities and  luxuries  is  to  impose  an  undue  burden  on 
the  laboring  class.  Hence,  it  violates  the  first  prin- 
ciple of  taxation  and  is  working  directly  against  the 
well-established  practice  of  the  modern  advanced 
countries.  Experience  in  other  countries  has  also 


33 


demonstrated  that  infant  industries  such  as  those  de- 
veloping in  China  must  need  protection  in  order  to 
secure  for  them  a normal  growth  and  development. 
This  is  not  necessarily  a selfish  policy,  as  to  foster 
home  industries  is  but  one  of  the  most  effective  means 
of  increasing  the  per  capita  wealth  of  the  country 
and  consequently  the  purchasing  power  of  the  nation 
for  foreign  goods  and  commodities.  Therefore,  even 
from  the  point  of  view  of  their  own  commercial  in- 
terest, the  treaty  powers  should  agree  to  the  complete 
removal  of  the  tariff  restrictions  on  China. 

The  second  great  defect  of  the  conventional  tariff 
in  China  is  that  it  provides  for  only  a five  per  cent 
tariff,  which  is  entirely  too  low  for  revenue  purposes. 
This  is  self-evident  when  we  compare  the  custom 
receipts  of  the  various  countries.  In  the  United  States 
the  revenue  of  the  Federal  government  before  the 
Civil  War  consisted  chiefly  of  custom  receipts.  Even 
in  the  fiscal  year  1913-1914  just  before  the  outbreak 
of  the  world  war  the  custom  receipts  yielded  some 
39  per  cent  of  the  total  Federal  income.  In  Ger- 
many customs  and  excises  also  contributed  in  1913 
about  45  per  cent  of  the  total  ordinary  revenue.  In 
France  in  1914  customs  yielded  some  20  per  cent  of 
the  total  revenue  including  both  direct  taxes  and  direct 
contributions.  Even  Great  Britain,  a free-trade  coun- 
try, depends  upon  its  tariff  for  revenue.  The  duties 
on  imports  alone  amounted  in  1914  to  over  22  per  cent 
of  the  total  revenue.  On  the  other  hand,  China 
realized  in  1914  only  about  9 per  cent  of  her  total 
revenue  from  customs.  It  is  true  that  in  that  year 
the  total  revenue  of  the  state  was  $351,064,812,  while 
the  custom  revenue  amounted  to  HK  Tls  18,  202,741 


34 


were  derived  from  import  duties.  In  China,  unlike  in 
other  countries,  the  maritime  customs  include  not 
only  import  duties  but  also  export  duties,  coast  trade 
duties,  tonnage  dues,  transit  dues  and  opium  likin. 
This  in  part  explains  why  China  has  to  borrow,  even 
under  onerous  terms,  for  reorganization  and  other 
purposes.  This  in  part  is  also  responsible  for  the 
political  intrigue  carried  on  in  the  various  foreign 
loans  that  threaten  to  destroy  the  fiscal  independence 
of  the  Republic  of  China.  It  is  clear  therefore  that 
if  justice  is  not  to  be  denied  to  China  and  if  China 
is  to  be  given  a fair  chance  to  work  out  her  own 
salvation,  she  must  have  her  tariff  autonomy  restored. 
This  is  beneficial  not  only  to  the  Chinese  nation  as  a 
whole  but  also  to  all  the  treaty  powers  concerned,  as 
a stable  government  based  on  sound  finance  will  enable 
the  Chinese  people  to  improve  their  communication 
facilities,  to  develop  their  natural  resources  and  there- 
by to  increase  the  volume  of  international  trade  and 
commerce.  The  fact  that  likin  has  been  a great 
obstacle  to  both  internal  and  external  trade  and  that 
its  abolition  must  necessarily  be  accompanied  by  in- 
creasing the  tariff  rate  as  a compensation,  makes  it 
even  more  necessary  that  these  crippling  tariff 
restrictions  on  China  should  be  abolished. 

The  history  of  the  conventional  tariff  having  been 
briefly  stated  and  its  main  features  discussed,  it  re- 
mains for  us  to  emphasize  once  more  the  grave 
injustice  done  to  China  by  the  treaty  powers.  It 
can  not  be  too  often  nor  too  strongly  stated  that  if  this 
tariff  remains  in  force,  China  will  he  permanently 
crippled  both  in  respect  to  her  internal  development 
and  her  foreign  trade.  Growing  industries  must  be 


35 


impeded.  Revenues  will  be  insufficient.  Foreign 
loans  must  be  contracted.  The  people  who  are  obliged 
to  pay  high  duties  on  necessities  will  have  their  already 
heavy  burdens  unduely  increased.  And  the  foreign 
trade  can  not  be  sufficiently  developed  either  to  bal- 
ance or  to  counteract  these  evils. 

Not  alone  is  this  conventional  tariff  detrimental 
to  the  best  interest  of  the  Chinese  Republic  but  it  is 
also  harmful  to  the  various  powers  concerned.  It 
must  be  clear  to  every  thoughtful  person  that  a China, 
unabled  to  develop  her  resources  and  consequently 
having  next  to  no  foreign  trade,  can  contribute  very 
little  to  the  development  of  the  world,  and  that  thus 
the  treaty  powers,  by  persisting  in  their  atti- 
tude, are  indirectly  injuring  themselves.  Therefore, 
not  only  justice  but  also  the  self-interest  of  the  treaty 
powers  demands  that  China  should  have  restored  to 
her  the  tariff  autonomy  to  which  every  free  nation  is 
justly  entitled. 

V.  The  Relinquishment  of  Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction 

The  origin  of  extraterritoriality  in  China  can  be 
traced  as  far  back  as  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries  when  a want  of  regard  for  Chinese  laws 
characterized  the  foreigners  who  went  to  China  for 
the  sole  purpose  of  replenishing  their  purses.  Great 
Britain,  especially,  resisted  the  exercise  of  China’s 
jurisdiction  over  her  subjects  in  criminal  cases.  Finally 
a bill  passed  the  House  of  Commons  in  1833  which 
provided  for  the  establishment  of  a British  court  in 
China  and  this  was  duly  executed  later  in  the  year. 
The  Treaty  of  Nanking  between  China  and  Great 

36 


Britain  in  1842  did  not  expressly  provide  for  the  en- 
joyment of  a privilege  of  extraterritoriality  by  British 
subjects;  but  at  the  same  time  there  were  substantial 
grounds  for  believing  that  such  a concession  was 
granted  by  the  Chinese  authority  as  part  of  the  price 
paid  for  the  restoration  of  peace  and  friendship.  The 
grounds  for  so  believing  are  that  the  General  Regula- 
tions signed  between  China  and  Great  Britain  referred 
to  a certain  correspondence  exchanged  at  Nanking  in 
1842  which  conceded  to  Britain  the  principles  of 
extraterritoriality,  that  such  a concession  by  China  was 
expressly  stated  by  the  Marquis  of  Lansdowne  in  the 
House  of  Lords  some  three  months  after  the  treaty 
of  Nanking  arrived  at  London,  and  that  the  General 
Regulations  were  considered  and  imderstood  at  the 
time  as  forming  a part  of  the  treaty  of  peace.  China’s 
formal  recognition  of  alien  extraterritoriality  was 
embodied  in  the  Treaty  of  Peking,  signed  in  1860, 
after  the  war  between  China  and  the  allied  forces  of 
Great  Britain  and  France.  Since  that  year,  subse- 
quent treaties  with  America,  Sweden,  Denmark,  and 
almost  all  the  other  countries  with  whom  China  had 
conventions  gave  this  extraterritorial  jurisdiction  to 
foreigners  residing  in  China.  In  1876  the  treaty  of 
Chefoo  was  entered  between  China  and  Great  Britain 
as  the  result  of  the  murder  of  an  Englishman  in 
Yim-Nan,  a southern  province,  by  the  uncivilized 
mountain  tribes  there.  One  of  the  important  features 
of  this  treaty  is  the  recognition  by  China  of  the  alien 
extraterritorial  jurisdiction  in  her  territory.  Foreign 
and  mixed  courts  are  now  established  in  the  alien  set- 
tlements and  leased  territories  to  try  cases  in  which 
aliens  are  involved. 


37 


To  understand  this  problem  we  shall  first  examine 
the  rules  governing-  the  exercise  of  such  rights  of 
extraterritoriality.  If  a case  concerns  the  aliens  of  one 
and  the  same  nationality,  then  all  questions  in  re- 
gard to  rights,  whether  of  property  or  of  person,  shall 
be  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  their  own  authorities. 
But  if  the  dispute  affects  the  subjects  of  different 
nationalities,  then  it  shall  be  regulated  by  the  treaties 
existing  between  the  various  states,  “without  inter- 
ference on  the  part  of  China.”  In  respect  to  mixed 
suits  or  actions  between  Chinese  and  foreigners,  the 
treaties  provide  that  in  civil  suits  Chinese  and  -aliens 
shall  state  their  grievances  at  the  alien  consulate  and 
in  case  the  consul  cannot  settle  them  amicably,  then 
he  shall  request  the  assistance  of  the  Chinese  authori- 
ties ; and,  in  criminal  cases,  Chinese  crimlinals  shall  be 
tried  and  punished  by  Chinese  authorities,  according 
to  Chinese  law,  while  alien  criminals  shall  be  tried  by 
their  consuls  and  punished  according  to  their  own 
national  law.  There  is  another  novel  system  existing 
in  Shanghai  both  in  the  International  and  French  Set- 
tlements. It  is  the  so-called  Mixed  Court.  A mixed 
court  is  a Chinese  tribunal  which  decides  all  suits  and 
actions  between  Chinese  who  are  resident  within  the 
settlements,  as  well  as  between  Chinese  and  foreign 
residents  in  cases  where  Chinese  are  defendants. 

The  extent  of  extraterritorial  jurisdiction  in  China 
covered  all  questions  in  regard  to  rights  of  property 
and  of  person.  In  practice,  the  jurisdiction  over  the 
person  of  aliens  in  China  is  very  far-reaching  and  un- 
limited. For  instance,  wherever  a subject  of  a for- 
eign power  may  go  wiithin  the  Chinese  dominions  he 
brings  with  him  his  right  of  exemption  from  the  ter- 

38 


ritorial  jurisdiotion  and  when  he  commits  an  ofifence 
he  shall  be  handed  over  to  the  nearest  consul  of  his 
nation  for  punishment.  By  right  of  extraterritoriality, 
a foreigner  in  China  is  immune  from  search  by 
Chinese  authorities  in  his  house  or  vessel  within  the 
treaty  ports.  Under  the  aegis  of  extraterritoriality 
there  has  grown  up  in  some  twenty-five  open  ports  a 
practice  for  some  of  the  grantees  to  establish  their 
own  post  olifices  therein.  After  the  Boxer  troubles  of 
IQOO,  to  prevent  a recrudescence  of  the  anti-foreign 
outrages,  international  garrisons  are  stationed  between 
Tientsin  and  Peking  and  the  Legation  Quarter  in 
Peking  maintains  its  own  legation  guards.  All  these 
practices  impair  China’s  territorial  integrity  and  na- 
tional independence  and  were  imposed  upon  China 
against  her  will. 

Deficiencies  of  the  extraterritorial  jurisdiction  are 
numerous  and  they  constitute  strong  reasons  for  its 
relinquishment.  A Chinese  may  enter  a suit  against  a 
foreigner  in  the  latter’s  national  court,  or  vice  versa, 
but  the  latter  is  entitled  to  no  relief  if  he  counter- 
claims against  the  plaintiff.  This  disability  may  entail 
hardships  and  inconveniences,  but  it  is  a necessary 
result  of  the  immunity  from  process  in  the  local  courts. 
It  is  the  price  for  which  they  must  pay  for  this  im- 
munity. Therefore  extraterritoriality  is  not  at  all 
absolutely  advantageous  to  the  aliens  who  enjoy  it. 

Uncertainty  of  punishment  in  the  system  causes 
much  complaint  among  the  Chinese  against  this  sys- 
tem. Difficulties  in  the  way  of  languages,  differences 
in  court  procedure,  the  disparity  of  punishments  in 
the  two  systems  and  the  complexities  of  Western  law 
prevent  a Chinese  from  having  his  redress  against  an 


39 


alien  in  the  latter’s  consular  court.  Then  there  is  the 
practice  in  most  consular  courts  for  the  prisoners 
charged  with  grave  offences'  to  be  sent  home  for  final 
trial  and  punishment.  In  such  cases  the  sequel  is 
generally  unknown  to  the  Chinese  directly  interested 
and  the  belief  becomes  inevitable  that  such  criminals 
have  escaped  unpunished.  This  practice,  therefore, 
both  damages  the  good  name  of  the  foreign  country 
and  robs  the  Chinese  of  the  satisfaction  of  knowing 
that  due  punishment  has  been  inflicted  on  the  guilty. 
Moreover,  alien  offenders  of  law  are  more  leniently 
treated  by  his  consular  court  than  a Chinese  by  his 
own  national  court.  But  Chinese  involved  in  law 
suits  in  the  mixed  court  are  treated  very  harshly. 
For  instance,  an  accidental  homicide  is  excusable  in 
Western  law,  but  in  Chinese  law  the  accused  is  never- 
theless made  to  compensate  the  family  of  the  deceased. 
Over  this  point  cases  of  disputes  between  China  and 
the  Western  powers  are  repeatedly  found  in  the  his- 
tory of  Chinese  diplomacy.  On  the  other  hand,  crimi- 
nal carelessness  may  not  be  punishable  unless  it 
results  in  an  injur)-^  to  the  person  of  another,  as  an  in- 
jury invol-ving  damage  to  property  is  civilly  action- 
able; but  in  the  Shanghai  foreign  settlements,  Chinese 
are  convicted  and  sentenced  to  imprisonment  by  the 
mixed  courts  for  carelessness  resulting  in  damage  to 
the  property  of  aliens. 

Besides  these  legal  objections  to  the  extraterritorial 
jurisdiction  in  China,  the  system  is  very  obstructive 
to  foreign  trade  in  China.  Owing  to  the  almost  un- 
limited rights  of  extraterritoriality,  China  cannot 
throw  her  d'oors  wide  open  to  all  aliens  to  trade  in 
all  parts  of  China.  Owing  to  the  demarcated  areas 


40 


within  the  open  ports  and  the  separate  iminiicipal  ad- 
ministrations in  those  areas,  Chinese  look  upon  aliens 
with  suspicion  and  unfriendly  feelings.  If  lintema- 
tional  trade  in  China  is  to  thrive  and  not  to  be  hinder- 
ed by  artificial  barriers,  early  relinquishment  of  all  the 
extraterritorial  rights  by  all  treaty  states  with  China 
must  be  promised.  When  China  is  open  to  the  resi- 
dence of  all  aliens  and  all  restrictions  as  to  passports, 
demarcated  areas,  etc.,  are  disposed  with,  a new  era  of 
prosperity  of  Far  Eastern  Trade  will  inaugurate. 

In  present  day  China,  any  fear  of  possible  renewal 
of  anti-foreign  movement  has  no  more  ground  for 
existence  because  the  conservative  Manchu  dynasty 
has  been  replaced  since  1911  by  the  progressive  re- 
publican government.  Moreover,  China  has  long 
awakened  to  her  international  obligations.  Her  inter- 
national status  has  been  definitely  settled.  She  has 
participated  in  the  Hague,  Geneva,  and  other  universal 
conventions.  She  has  also  taken  part  in  such  minor 
international  gatherings  as  legislated  for  the  white 
slave  traffic,  protection  of  birds,  bills  of  exchange, 
prison  reform,  hygiene  and  sanitation,  and  the  like. 
She  was  formally  recognized  as  a member  of  the 
family  of  nations  soon  after  her  revolution  eight  years 
ago.  And,  lastly,  but  most  significantly,  China  dili- 
gently engaged  herself  in  the  recent  world  struggle 
against  German  autocracy,  in  checking  the  eastward 
advance  of  the  Bolsheviki  movement  in  Siberia,  in 
forming  the  peace  treaty  of  1919  at  Paris,  and  in 
drafting  the  Constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
Therefore  she  is  universally  recognized  to-day  an 
independent  sovereignty,  and  as  such  she  must  be 
treated  accordingly.  Nothing  in  international  law 


41 


hinders  a nation  from  existing  as  an  independent  state 
more  than  the  practice  of  extraterritorial  jurisdiction, 
and  therefore  its  abolition  must  be  immediately  ac- 
ceded. 

It  is  indeed  true  that  China  has  defects  in  her 
judicial  system.  But  she  has  shown  great  progress 
toward  the  legal  reform  during  the  last  few  years.  In 
1904  a code  of  commercial  law,  following  the  prin- 
ciples of  that  of  England,  was  adopted.  A Bureau  of 
Law  Reform  was  established  in  Peking  in  1908  to  take 
up  the  work  of  recodification  of  Qiinese  Laws.  This 
was  succeeded  by  Law  Codification  Commission,  ap- 
pointed in  1914.  This  commission,  with  a group  of 
foreign  advisers,  has  been  studying  all  law  systems  of 
the  world.  Efforts  have  been  made  to  codify  Chinese 
laws  in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  European  and 
American  laws.  Already  a draft  of  new  criminal 
code  was  published  in  Chinese  last  September,  which 
was  subsequently  translated  with  English  and  Erench. 
A new  Civil  Code  is  in  the  process  of  revising  now. 
It  has  been  the  hope  of  the  commission  that  within 
five  years  the  revision  of  Chinese  Laws  will  be  com- 
pleted and  promulgated.  Thus  China’s  claim  of  relin- 
quishment by  extraterritoriality,  gradually  if  not  im- 
mediately, is  not  altogether  unjustifiable. 

As  to  the  stationing  of  international  garrison  and 
legation  guards  in  China,  no  more  necessity  is  found 
today.  Anyone  who  is  in  any  way  familiar  with  re- 
cent affairs  in  China  can  recall  that  every  time  there 
is  any  disturbance  in  any  part  of  China,  the  Chinese 
authorities,  whether  north  or  south,  immediately  pro- 
ceed to  protect  the  aliens’  person  and  property.  In 
no  case  has  this  duty  been  neglected.  China  has  been 


42 


known  as  one  of  the  most  trustworthy  nations  in  ad- 
hering to  her  treaty  obligations.  She  should  be  given 
a free  hand  to  guard  foreign  legations  in  Peking  and 
the  international  guards  should  be  called  back  at  once, 
because  her  troops  and  police  are  capable  enough  now 
to  look  after  the  safety  of  foreigners  in  China. 

Regarding  foreign  postal  system  in  China,  there 
is  no  more  need  of  its  further  existence  either.  Since 
March  i,  1914,  China  is  admitted  as  a member  of  the 
International  Postal  Union.  The  act  of  admitting  a 
new  member  presupposes  a recognition  of  the  effi- 
ciency of  its  system  on  the  part  of  the  co-signatories 
of  the  union.  Therefore  there  is  no  valid  reason  for 
the  continuous  existence  of  these  twenty-five  foreign 
post  offices  in  different  parts  of  China. 

From  the  above  facts,  it  is  clear  to  the  world  that 
the  relinquishment  of  extraterritorial  jurisdiction  in 
China  is  not  a problem  of  non-importance.  Already, 
in  1902,  the  Chino-British  Commercial  Treaty  of 
Shanghai  expressed  Britain’s  willingness  to  relinquish 
her  extraterritoriality  in  China  in  these  words  : “China 
having  expressed  a strong  desire  to  reform  her  judicial 
.system  and  to  bring  it  into  accord  with  that  of  Western 
Nations,  Great  Britain  agrees  to  give  every  assistance 
to  such  reform,  and  she  will  also  be  prepared  to  re- 
linquish her  extraterritorial  rights  when  she  is  satis- 
fied that  the  state  of  Chinese  laws,  the  arrangement 
for  their  administration,  and  other  considerations  war- 
rant her  in  so  doing.”  The  United  States  and  Japan 
followed  the  example  of  Great  Britain  in  1903  and 
Sweden  in  1908  in  promising  to  relinquish  their  extra- 
territorial rights  when  they  shall  find  China’s  laws 
satisfactory  to  them.  This  consent  might  have  been 


43 


perfect  if  it  had  been  coupled  with  either  a probation- 
aiy  time-limit  clause  or  an  honor  clause,  or  both.  To 
say  that  within  a definite  period  of,  say,  five  years 
if  China  shall  satisfactorily  reform  her  judiciary  in 
harmony  with  the  Western  systems,  all  extraterritorial 
rights  therein  will  be  withdrawn  or  surrendered,  would 
povide  a strong  incentive  to  a people  who  are  doing 
their  utmost  to  put  their  house  in  order.  China  thus 
waits  for  a fair  and  just  decision  from  the  Conference. 

VI.  The  Retrocession  of  Leased  Territories 

To  treat  in  great  detail  the  causes  and  events  of  the 
Opium  War  of  1842  and  the  Arrow  War  of  i860  will 
be  too  long  a story.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  these  wars 
were  the  first  ones  that  led  China  to  open  her  ports 
to  foreign  trade,  and  they  marked  a new  era  in  the 
history'  of  Chinese  diplomacy.  Before  the  former 
date,  it  is  true,  there  were  foreigners  in  China.  But 
their  status  was  of  an  undefined  nature.  In  1842  the 
Treaty  of  Nanking  was  entered  between  China  and 
Britain  and  five  ports  were  thrown  open  to  inter- 
national trade,  namely.  Canton,  Foochow,  Amoy, 
Ningpo  and  Shanghai.  Besides,  China  for  the  first 
time  in  her  recent  history  ceded  to  Great  Britain  by  this 
treaty  the  island  of  Hong-Kong.  The  treaty  of  Pe- 
king of  i860  which  concluded  the  Arrow  War  between 
China  on  the  one  hand  and  the  allied  forces  of  Great 
Britain  and  France  on  the  other,  ceded  to  Great 
Britain  a portion  of  the  township  of  Kowloon,  which 
is  a peninsula  standing  in  a strategic  position  over- 
looking Hong-Kong.  For  a long  time  Great  Britain 
coveted  this  territory  and  before  the  signing  of  the 
Treaty  of  Peking  she  had  already  secured  a lease  of 


44 


the  same  in  peq)etuity.  Eleven  more  ports  were  opened 
in  i86i.  They  were:  Newchwang,  Tenchow,  Taiwang, 
Tsaochow,  Hainan,  Tansui,  Nanking,  Chenkiang, 
Kiukiang  Hankow  and  Tientsin.  Fifteen  years  later, 
in  the  treaty  of  Chefoo,  entered  into  between  China 
and  Great  Britain,  five  more  ports — Yeechang,  Wuhu. 
Wen-Chow,  Peihai  of  Kwangtung  Province  and 
Tsung-Chin  of  Szechuan  Province — were  opened  to 
foreign  trade. 

The  “scramble”  for  territorial  leases  and  rail- 
way and  mining  concessions  of  1898  marked  the 
climax  of  foreign  aggression  in  China.  For  a petty 
grievance  of  the  murder  of  two  German  mission- 
aries in  Shangtung  province,  China  was  made  to 
lease  to  Germany  under  duress  Kiao-Chou  for  a 
period  of  ninety-nine  years.  Germany  also  forced 
China  to  cede  to  her  railway  and  mining  rights  in 
the  province  of  Shantung.  Although  the  leased 
territory  was  meant  to  be  enjoyed  by  the  lessee 
for  peaceful  engagements,  Germany  made  use  of  it 
as  a naval  station.  Russia,  one  of  the  two  imperialistic 
countries  in  the  Far  East,  forced  China  to  lease  to 
her  Liaotung  Peninsula  for  a period  of  twenty-five 
years.  In  1905,  this  lease  was  transferred  to  Japan 
by  Russia  as  one  of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of 
Portsmouth  which  concluded  the  Russo-Japanese 
War,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  such  leases  were 
explicitly  made  non-transferable.  The  Treaty  of 
May  25,  1915,  between  China  and  Japan  extended 
the  lease  to  ninety-nine  years.  In  the  same  year, 
1898,  France  obtained  a lease  from  China  of  Kwang 
Chow- Wan  for  ninety-nine  years  and  -Great  Britain 
obtained  from  China  a lease  of  Weihaiwei  “for  so 


45 


long  a period  as  Port  Arthur  (the  lease  of 
Liaotung  Peninsula,  including  the  famous  port,  Port 
Arthur)  shall  remain  in  the  occupation  of  Russia.” 
In  their  essential  features,  these  leases  resemble  one 
another;  and  for  the  duration  of  the  tenancy  the 
territorial  sovereign’s  administrative  rights  are 
suspended,  unless  expressly  reserved,  and  in  their 
place  those  of  the  lessee  states  substituted. 

The  places  agreed  upon  for  international  trade 
and  residence  are  of  four  different  liinds:  (i)  A 
concession,  or  piece  of  territory  conveyed  by  deed 
of  grant  in  perpetuity  to  a lessee  state  for  the 
residence  of  its  nationals,  the  same  to  be  admin- 
istered by  it,  “saving  the  sovereign  rights  of  the 
Emperor  of  China.”  (2)  A settlement,  or  site 
selected  for  the  residence  of  all  foreigners,  within 
which  they  may  organize  themselves  into  munic- 
ipality for  certain  purposes  and  be  governed  by 
their  elected  representatives.  (3)  A voluntary  set- 
tlement, or  one  in  a port  spontaneously  opened  by 
China  itself  for  the  residence  of  aliens,  of  which 
the  control  of  municipal  administration  and  police 
remain  vested  in  the  local  authorities.  (4)  A set- 
tlement by  sufferance,  or  one  within  which  the  resi- 
dents have  acquired,  without  any  formal  agreement 
on  the  part  of  the  territorial  sovereign,  the  tacit 
right  to  govern  themselves  as  a municipality. 

It  is  clear  that  all  these  leased  territories  and  settle- 
ments were  wrung  from  China  unwillingly.  More- 
over, the  object  of  the  powers  in  occupying  these 
strategic  ports  was  for  purposes  of  keeping  “balance 
of  power”  one  with  another.  This  phrase,  however, 
has  only  a historical  value  to-day  and  is  no  longer 

46 


applicable  to  the  Far  Eastern  situation.  The  lease  of 
Kiao-Chou  like  that  of  Port  Arthur,  was  illegally  trans- 
ferred to  Japan  in  1915.  Such  transference  may  be 
diplomatic,  but  they  are  illegal  insofar  as  China  is 
concerned  with  the  lessee  and  cannot  let  any  other 
power  to  take  over  the  leased  rights.  The  prin- 
ciple of  the  League  of  Nations  as  proposed  by 
President  Wilson  is  to  do  away  with  the  balance  of 
power  among  the  strong  nations  in  the  weaker  and 
less  developed  countries.  The  allied  powers  can 
do  no  better  good  to  China  than  to  return  these 
leased  territories  to  China  so  as  to  do  full  justice 
to  the  League  of  Nations.  All  jealousy  and 
suspicion  among  the  Western  nations  and  Japan  in 
their  interests  in  China  will  be  done  away  with  if 
the  first  principle  of  open  diplomacy  is  to  be  en- 
forced. Besides,  China  is  never  going  to  alienate  any 
part  of  her  territory  to  any  foreign  power  here- 
after, as  her  Peace  Delegates  openly  proclaimed  in 
Paris  recently,  and  China  will  be  thrown  wide  open 
to  all  foreign  trade  and  residence  without  any  fur- 
ther need  of  the  sphere  of  influence  of  any  power 
in  any  part  of  China.  In  the  treaties  of  these  leases, 
almost  invariably  there  were  the  so-called  non- 
alienation clause  regarding  to  railway  and  mining 
rights  China  ceded  to  the  lessees. 

Today,  the  sole  power  that  is  dominating  the  Far 
Eastern  Affairs  is  Japan,  who  holds  both  the  leases  of 
Port  Arthur  and  of  Kiao-Chou,  which  formerly  be- 
longed to  Russia  and  Germany  respectively.  China 
will  neither  stand  for  a further  extention  of  balance  of 
power,  which  will  be  contradictory  both  to  the 
principles  of  the  Open  Door  policy  as  proclaimed 


47 


by  Secretary  John  Hay  of  the  United  States  in  1898 
right  after  the  “scramble”  for  concessions,  and 
to  the  principles  of  the  League  of  Nations; 
nor  will  Qiina  stand  for  the  most  unwel- 
comed Japanese  domination  in  China.  The  political 
philosophy  of  an  international  democracy  is  a 
product  of  the  twentieth  century  and  the  allied 
powers  are  its  creators.  If  such  a democratic 
political  philosophy  is  to  prevail  and  to  lead  to  per- 
petual peace  among  nations,  neither  balance  of 
power  nor  Japanese  domination  in  China  should  be 
tolerated  by  all  the  nations  in  the  world.  Circum- 
stances which  had  called  the  leased  territories  into 
existence  have  now  all  fundamentally  altered.  New 
circumstances  have  now  come  into  existence  which 
call  very  urgently  for  the  restoration  of  the  leased 
territories  to  China.  The  United  States,  being 
China’s  special  friend  and  the  originator  of  the  Open 
Door  policy  in  China,  ought  to  finish  the  game  by  abso- 
lutely mowing  out  seeds  of  imperialism  and  autocracy 
in  the  Far  East  as  well  as  in  Europe,  and  advocate  the 
restoration  of  all  the  leased  territories  and  settlements 
in  China. 

VII.  The  Abolition  of  Financial  Imperialism 

Financial  Imperialism  is  the  financial  control  of 
one  nation  over  another  through  politics.  It  is  firstly 
to  control  a nation  financially,  then  to  strangle  it  and 
finally  to  place  it  under  alien  receivership.  As  applied 
to  China  the  control  is  deliberately  planned.  It  has 
a malicious  purpose.  Every  nation  has  her  own  in- 

48 


terest  to  serve.  Hence  there  was  “battle  of  conces- 
sions” and  there  was  general  scramble  at  the  expense 
of  China. 

The  most  objectionable  fact  is  the  system  which 
sanctions  what  is  known  as  the  right  of  preference. 
It  consists  of  two  main  species.  The  first  is  the 
polito-commercial  zone  system  styled  “Spheres  of 
Influence”  signifying  that  a particular  piece  of  terri- 
tory shall  not  be  alienated  to  any  third  state  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  other  contracting  party.  The 
second  provides  that  one  contracting  state  shall 
have  the  right  to  be  offered  the  first  option  to  accept 
or  refuse  a certain  contemplated  transaction.  Let 
us  consider  the  first.  Elaborate  historical  treatment 
is  unnecessary.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  a little  after 
the  Chino-Japanese  war  the  battle  of  concessions 
was  started.  In  1897  France  wanted  China  to  de- 
clare for  herself  that  she  would  never  alienate  or 
cede  the  Island  of  Hainan  to  any  foreign  power 
“either  as  a final  or  temporary  cession  or  as  a naval 
station  or  a coaling  depot.”  In  1898  Great  Britain 
suggested  and  China  agreed  that  she  shall  never 
alienate  the  provinces  adjourning  Yangtze  River 
either  as  lease  mortgage  or  any  other  designation. 
In  order  to  make  her  position  doubly  secure  Great 
Britain  had  tipped  off  the  once  terrible  Polar  Bear 
by  the  understanding  reached  between  the  two 
powers  declaring  that  “first  Great  Britain  engages 
not  to  seek  for  her  own  account  or  on  behalf  of  Brit- 
ish subjects  or  others  any  railroad  concessions  to 
the  north  of  the  Great  Wall  of  China  and  not  to  ob- 
struct directly  or  indirectly  applications  for  railroad 
concessions  in  that  region  supported  by  Russian 


49 


g’overnment,  and  secondly  Russia  on  her  part  en- 
gages not  to  seek  for  her  own  account  or  on  behalf 
of  Russian  subjects  or  others  any  railroad  conces- 
sions in  the  basin  of  the  Yangtze  and  not  to  obstruct 
directly  or  indirectly  applications  for  railroad  con- 
cessions in  that  region  supported  by  the  British 
government.”  In  1898,  due  to  the  demand  of  Japan, 
China  declared  non-alienation  of  the  province  of 
Fukien  “with  all  the  territory  in  the  interior  and 
along  the  sea  coast  within  its  limits.”  In  1915 
China  declared  to  the  same  power  that  within  the 
province  of  Shantung  or  along  its  coast  no  terri- 
tory or  island  shall  be  leased  or  ceded  to  any  for- 
eign power  under  any  pretext.  In  the  same  year 
she  further  assured  the  same  power  that  she  has 
given  no  permission  to  foreign  nations  to  construct 
on  the  coast  of  Fukien  province  dockyards,  coaling 
stations  for  military  purposes,  naval  bases,  or  to  set 
up  other  military  establishments. 

The  legal  phase  of  the  sphere  of  influence  need 
not  be  discussed,  for,  aside  from  the  formal  con- 
ventions which  might  seemingly  give  it  legal  sanc- 
tity, international  law  does  not  justify  its  exist- 
ence. The  law  of  nations  allows  the  excluding  of 
other  powers  in  a given  territory  by  a given  power 
only  when  that  territory  is  contiguous  to  her  do- 
minions or  protectorates  or  strategic  locations  that 
may  be  used  to  the  disadvantage  to  the  said  power 
by  an  enem3^  China  is  neither  a dominion  of  nor 
a protectorate  under  any  power,  hence  no  spheres 
of  influence  can  be  recognized. 

It  is,  however,  the  economic  side  that  endangers 
China  most.  These  so-called  “spheres”  are  really 
politico-commercial  zone  systems.  They  influence 

50 


the  exchange  of  commodities  as  well  as  the  import 
of  capital.  The  power  that  has  the  predominating 
influence  can  always  create  artificial  conditions  in 
favor  of  her  own  commodities.  These  artificial  con- 
ditions may  take  the  form  of  reduced  taxes,  rebates 
in  transportation  or  in  half  a dozen  other  ways.  As 
far  as  commodities  are  concerned,  however,  there 
may  not  be  sufficient  ground  for  over  apprehension, 
for  after  all  competition  may  not  be  entirely  done 
away  with.  We  can  manage  to  adapt  ourselves  to 
new  conditions  and  struggle  for  the  markets.  But 
when  we  consider  the  import  of  capital  we  face  a 
different  problem.  As  is  deducible  from  the 
Anglo-Russian  agreement,  the  necessary  result 
from  this  zone  system  will  be  as  is  intended  to  be 
the  exodus  of  available  capital  from  other  sources. 
No  nation  will  take  the  chance  of  stepping  into 
somebody’s  threshold  if  she  is  not  ready  to  go  to 
the  limit,  which  in  the  last  analysis  may  mean  war. 
Economically  speaking  then,  the  sphere  of  influ- 
ence is  really  no  less  than  a political  guarantee  of 
a monopoly  for  economic  exploitation  by  the  coun- 
try that  has  the  predominating  influence.  The  ex- 
clusive character  can  not  be  over-emphasized,  for 
it  is  the  one  factor  that  gives  to  those  spheres  their 
unique  distinction  as  well  as  notoriety.  Such  is 
financial  imperialism  pure  and  simple.  It  is  the 
alliance  of  power  with  wealth,  the  combination  of 
flag  and  capital  that  has  played  such  havoc  with 
the  peaceful  Republic. 

The  second  of  the  system  of  rights  of  prefer- 
ence is  the  right  of  the  first  option  to  accept  or 
refuse  a certain  contemplated  transaction.  It  ap- 
plies to  loans  as  well  as  railroad  and  other  con- 


51 


cessions.  Art.  XVII  of  the  Reorganization  Loan 
of  iqi3  for  25,000,000  pounds  sterling,  for  example, 
reads  as  follows:  “In  the  event  of  the  Chinese 
Government  desiring  to  issue  further  loans  secured 
upon  the  revenues  of  the  salt  administration,  or 
to  issue  supplementary  loans  for  the  purposes  of 
the  nature  of  those  specified  in  Art.  II  of  this  agree- 
ment, the  Chinese  Government  will  give  to  the 
banks  the  option  of  taking  such  loans  . . . The 

Chinese  Government  undertakes  further  that  for 
a period  of  six  months  after  the  complete  issue  of 
this  present  loan  and  the  payment  of  the,  last  in- 
stalment thereof  in  terms  of  the  prospectus,  it  will 
not  proceed  to  the  issue  of  any  other  government 
loan  or  loan  having  a government  guarantee  con- 
cluded later  than  April  loth,  1913,  without  previous 
agreement  of  the  banks.”  The  right  of  first  op- 
tion is  even  more  clearly  brought  out  in  the  loan 
of  1911  for  industrial  development  and  currency  re- 
form. Art.  XVI  of  the  agreement  reads  “If  the 
Imperial  Chinese  Government  should  desire  to 
obtain,  from  other  than  Chinese  sources,  funds  in  ^ 
addition  to  the  proceeds  derived  from  the  loan  to 
continue  or  complete  the  operations  contemplated 
under  this  agreement  the  Imperial  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment shall  first  invite  the  banks  to  undertake  a 
loan  to  provide  the  funds  required;  but  should  the 
Imperial  Chinese  Government  fail  to  agree  with 
the  banks  as  to  the  terms  of  such  supplementary 
loan,  then  other  financial  groups  may  be  invited  to 
undertake  the  same  and  should  the  Imperial  Chinese 
Government  decide  to  invite  foreign  capitalists  to 
participate  with  Chinese  interests  in  Manchurian 


52 


business  contemplated  under  this  loan,  or  to  be 
undertaken  in  connection  therewith  the  banks  shall 
first  be  invited  to  participate.” 

The  same  can  be  said  of  railroad  loans  except 
the  stipulation  goes  even  further.  In  essence  it 
provides  that  the  creditor  having  advanced  the 
money  for  the  construction  of  a railroad  in  a given 
piece  of  territory,  all  funds  for  the  construction 
of  subsequent  lines  within  the  territory  will  like- 
wise be  provided  by  the  same  creditor  unless  he 
should  decline  the  option.  It. is  only  plain  that 
these  terms  are  onerous  to  a degree  that  is  unbear- 
able and  give  a political  hue  to  purely  financial 
transactions.  It  is  financial  imperialism,  it  is  again 
political  maneuvering  for  economic  exploitation. 
The  debtor  nation  may  want  to  borrow  else- 
where or  may  even  likely  secure  better  terms, 
but  under  the  agreement  she  must  approach  the 
same  creditor  nation  again  for  accommodations  un- 
less the  latter  chooses  to  decline.  This  creates  a 
virtual  monopoly  in  favor  of  generally  foreign 
capitalist  and  particularly  capitalists  of  the  con- 
tracting party.  With  the  politico-commercial  zone 
systems  installed  here  and  there  and  almost  every- 
where, the  question  is  whether  China  is  allowed  to 
stand  on  her  own  feet.  Is  she  to  be  helped  by  the 
family  of  nations  or  is  it  their  deliberate  attempt 
to  prove  that  the  history  of  Egypt  can,  and,  with  de- 
termination will  be  made  to  repeat  itself  in  China 
irrespective  of  consequences? 

The  scramble  for  the  privileges  for  railroad 
construction  is  described  by  Lord  Salisbury  as  the 
“battle  of  concessions.”  As  in  everything  else,  it 
is  essentially  politico-commercial.  The  very  nature 


53 


of  it  can  be  easily  imagined  by  the  claim  of  a cer- 
tain well  known  minister  at  Peking,  who  said,  “I 
repeat  what  I said  to  you  when  here,  not  a bona 
fide  or  approximately  practical  scheme  which  has 
been  brought  to  this  legation  has  failed  to  be  put 
through.”  One  can  readily  see  what  kind  of  terms 
are  generally  imposed  upon  China  when  the  diplo- 
mats flock  into  Peking  with  a group  of  shrewd  con- 
cessionaires. There  are  two  kinds  of  railroad  con- 
cessions: (i)  Concessions  to  foreign  governments, 
and  (2)  concessions  to  individuals  or  to  companies 
backed  up  by  their  respective  governments.  The 
first  group  of  concessions  to  foreign  governments 
was  demanded  for  political  purposes.  France  has 
extended  the  Tonking  line  into  Yunnanfu.  Russia 
has  extended  her  Trans-Siberian  into  Manchuria. 
Great  Britain  has  resorted  to  similar  measures.  But 
the  policy  of  Japan  in  South  Manchuria  affords 
an  illuminating  example  of  the  working  of  the 
“Spheres  of  Influence,”  of  the  doctrine  of  the  first 
option  and  of  “Spheres  of  Interests,”  especially  in 
connection  with  railroads.  After  the  Russo-Jap- 
anese War,  Japan  gained  the  vantage  ground  of 
Liao-tung  Peninsula  and  the  control  of  the  South 
Manchuria  railroad  through  the  instrumentality  of 
which  she  virtually  dominates  Manchuria.  In  the 
Portsmouth  treaty  and  in  her  subsequent  treaties 
with  China,  Japan  has  pledged  to  observe  the 
“Open  Door”  policy  and  to  preserve  the  integrity 
of  China.  But  no  sooner  than  the  war  had  been 
concluded  before  Japan  started  to  carry  out  her 
imperialistic  program.  At  the  point  of  bayonet 
she  forced  China  to  allow  her  to  build  the  new 


54 


Antung-Mukden  railroad.  She  furnished  half  of 
the  capital  for  the  construction  of  the  Hsinmingtun 
Mukden  and  Kirin  Changchun  lines.  In  obtaining 
these  concessions  she  took  care  to  make  it  under- 
stood that,  if  the  lines  were  to  be  extended,  appli- 
cation for  assistance  should  be  first  made  to  her. 
This  stipulation  did  not  seem  to  be  as  formidable 
as  it  really  was,  it  was  nothing  short  of  a monopoly. 

For  instance,  in  1907  China  made  a contract 
with  a British  firm  to  build  the  railroad  from 
Hsinmingtun  to  Fakumen  in  Manchuria.  Objec- 
tion was  made  b)'^  Japan  on  the  ground  that  this 
line  would  parallel  part  of  the  Japanese  South  Man- 
churian railroad  and  she  produced  in  support  of 
her  position  a secret  clause  of  the  Yuan-Komura 
agreement  in  1905  made  between  China  and  Japan 
concerning  Manchuria.  China  denied  that  she  had 
accepted  that  agreement;  but  Japan  induced  England 
to  refuse  support  to  the  British  firm,  and  China  was 
compelled  to  aibandon  the  project. 

Again,  in  1909,.  a project  was  developed  by 
American,  British  and  Chinese  interests  for  the 
construction  of  a Chinese  government  line  from 
Chinchow  to  Aigun.  The  plan  was  approved  by 
the  Chinese  government  and  had  the  support  of  the 
American  government.  It  is  generally  understood 
that  the  British  government  at  first  favored  the 
project  until  Japan  and  Russia  finally  signified 
their  disapproval.  They  absolutely  vetoed  the 
scheme  on  the  ground  that  it  would  be  a menace 
to  their  economic  interests  in  Manchuria.  The 
rights  and  interests  of  China  received  no  consider- 


55 


ation ; and  the  Chinese  government  and  American 
capital  were  forbidden  to  construct  a railroad  on  the 
Chinese  soil. 

While  the  negotiations  for  the  building  of  the 
Chinchow-Aigun  railroad  were  in  progress,  Mr. 
Knox,  then  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States, 
advanced  a proposal,  saying  “the  most  effective 
way  to  preserve  the  undisturbed  enjoyment  by 
China  of  all  political  rights  in  Manchuria  and  to 
promote  the  development  of  the  open  door  and 
equal  opportunity  would  be  to  bring  the  Man- 
churian highways,  the  railroads,  under  an  economic, 
scientific,  and  impartial  administration  by  some 
plan  vesting  in  China  the  ownership  of  the  railroads 
through  funds  furnished  for  that  purpose  by  the 
interested  powers  willing  to  participate.”  The' Brit- 
ish and  the  German  governments  were  in  sympa- 
thy with  the  general  principles  of  the  scheme ; but 
the  Japanese  government  promptly  announced  her 
disapproval.  As  a result  the  whole  project  was  set 
to  nought.  Whatever  the  merits  of  Mr.  Knox’s 
proposal,  it  clearly  brought  out  the  fact  that  Japan 
was  determined  to  keep  other  nations  out  of  Man- 
churia and  that  China’s  autonomy  was  seriously 
compromised. 

Turning  now  to  loans  we  will  find  the  same  in- 
tention to  control  China  financially  through  diplomacy. 
The  various  loans  are  too  numerous  to  enumerate. 
They  represent  also  an  enormous  sum.  The  an- 
nual interest  charges  are  already  a financial  strain 
to  a nation  that  is  yet  young  in  industrial  develop- 
ment. The  Boxer  Indemnities  add  to  the  drain  on  her 
economic  sources.  The  effect  of  both  these  charges 
is  to  so  reduce  the  revenue  of  the  government  that 

56 


most  of  the  reform  measures  can  not  be  carried  into 
conclusion.  It  is  bad  enough  to  be  a debtor  nation, 
worse  yet  is  it  to  be  one  that  has  to  accept  whatever 
usurious  and  onerous  terms  the  creditor  nations  may 
seek  to  impose. 

Of  loans  there  are  two  kinds.  One  is  the  public 
loan  and  the  other  is  the  loan  for  specific  purposes, 
as  for  instance  the  construction  of  railroads.  The 
latter  have  been  sufficiently  treated  under  railroad  con- 
cessions, hence  they  need  not  be  repeated  any  further. 
The  Public  loans  are  loans  directly  to  the  govern- 
ment for  general  purposes,  for  instance,  the  re- 
organization in  1913  after  the  Revolution.  Loans 
require  securities  of  one  sort  or  another,  and  in 
China  various  sources  of  revenue  where  the  gov- 
ernment derives  its  chief  support  are  pledged  as 
securities.  In  the  course  of  the  last  score  of  years, 
many  taxes,  as  the  custom  duties,  the  likin  charges, 
as  well  as  other  taxes,  were  already  pledged  as 
securities.  Should  there  ever  occur  a default  of 
payment  the  taxes  are  to  be  transferred  and  admin- 
istered by  the  custom  authorities.  Accordingly, 
China  appears  to  be  an  enormous  piece  of  mortgage. 
Other  provisions  are  equally  exacting  and  are  of 
a monopolistic  nature.  The  points  discussed  under 
previous  topics  apply  here  as  well.  In  1913,  for 
example,  failing  to  agree  with  the  banking  syndi- 
cate at  Peking,  China  succeeded  in  securing  credits 
in  the  London  market.  But  the  attempt  was  dis- 
credited by  the  syndicate.  It  merely  strengthened 
the  latter’s  cohesive  power.  The  Six  power  group 
subsequently  formed  with  the  backing  of  their  re- 
spective governments  worked  for  the  monopoly  of 


57 


loaning  money  to  China.  The  ulterior  motives  of 
some  powers  became  evident  during  the  process  of 
negotiations.  The  American  group  withdrew  after 
President  Wilson’s  declaration  that  the  United 
States  would  not  be  a party  to  any  attempt  to  ham- 
per the  young  Republic  financially  or  politically. 

There  is  no  need  for  describing  any  further. 
The  “Spheres  of  Influence,”  the  right  of  first  option, 
railroad  concessions  and  loans  point  unmistakably 
to  the  existence  of  financial  imperialism  or  of  a policy 
of  fin.ancial  control  through  diplomacy.  That  jus- 
tice demands  the  discontinuance  of  financial  imperi- 
alism under  all  circumstances  none  will  deny.  That 
even  expediency  demands  the  inauguration  of  a 
new  era  can  be  easily  explained.  The  world  has 
reached  a state  of  cosmopolitan  consciousness,  and 
its  chief  concern  in  future,  as  is  at  present,  will  be 
the  maintenance  of  peace.  Financial  imperialism 
as  practised  in  China  is  exclusive  of  each  other’s 
interests.  It  is  competitive  and  conflicting.  And 
where  there  is  conflicting  interest  there  is  germ  for 
rupture  which  may  eventually  lead  to  war.  The 
Avorld  is  tired  of  war.  Will  it  tolerate  factors  that 
cai’se  war? 


58 


SUMMARY 

The  above  peace  claims  of  China  do  not  suggest 
any  unreasonable  outburst  of  patriotic  passion,  but 
rather  indicate  briefly  the  wrongs  that  China  has 
suffered  in  the  past.  Since  China  began  her  rela- 
tions with  foreign  nations,  nearly  a century  ago, 
she  has  been  outraged  one  way  or  another  by  dif- 
ferent powers  at  different  times.  Her  international 
prestige  and  national  honor  have  been  broken  down 
to  pieces.  Her  territorial  integrity  has  been  no 
more  true  in  actual  conditions,  though  still  in  diplo- 
matic phraseology.  Her  political  independence  has 
been  reduced  to  nothing  but  a mere  fiction.  In  the 
late  years,  Japan  even  tries  to  get  control  of  her 
finance  and  army.  Thus  China  has  nearly  lost  her 
right  of  existence  as  a sovereign  and  independent 
nation.  Yet  China  has  always  showed  good  will 
toward  all,  and  given  no  provocation  to  any.  Is 
it  just  to  strangle  a nation  of  such  a brilliant  past 
and  of  such  a promising  future?  Is  it  right  to  en- 
danger the  destiny  of  400,000,000  industrious  and 
peace-loving  people? 

Surely  the  Peace  Conference  will  answer  these 
questions  negatively.  The  spirit  of  the  glorious 
victory  of  the  war  indicates  the  birth  of  a universal 
feeling  that  imperialism  of  any  description  must  be 
totally  condemned  and  cast  away  as  a dead  theory 
of  the  by-gone  generation ; the  goal  of  the  proposed 
League  of  Nations,  embodied  in  President  Wilson’s 
lofty  ideals  and  enlightened  principles,  promises 
to  mankind  an  upright  hew  regime  of  nationalism 
and  internationalism,  based  on  right  and  justice. 
With  this  spirit  and  toward  that  goal,  not  only 
China  has  the  ample  justification  to  claim  for  an 


59 


international  adjustment  that  would  give  her  an 
honorable  place  among  the  family  of  nations,  but 
also  the  Paris  Conference  has  an  important  duty  to 
work  out  such  a readjustment  so  as  to  make  China 
an  efficient  and  effective  member  of  the  League,  and 
unroot  all  the  causes  of  the  future  wars  now  fer- 
menting in  the  Far  East.  Such  a readjustment  will 
not  only  mean  the  safety  of  China’s  place  under  the 
sun,  but  ultimately  also  the  permanent  peace  of  the 
world. 

China  is  a sovereign  and  independent  nation. 
She  wants  to  exist  as  such.  Her  territorial  integ- 
rity must  be  maintained.  Kiao-Chou,  including  the 
port  of  Tsing-tao,  must  be  unconditionally  returned. 
Japanese  domination  in  China  in  general  and  in 
Shantung  and  Manchuria  in  particular  must  be  ter- 
minated. China  must  have  complete  sovereignty 
over  her  territory.  “Spheres  of  Influence”  must  be 
abolished.  All  the  territories  that  have  been  leased 
to  different  powers  against  China’s  will,  like  Port 
Arthur,  Talien-Wan,  Kwang-Chou-Wan  and  Wei- 
Hai-VVei,  should  be  one  and  all  restored  to  China. 
No  more  “Balance  of  Powers”  should  be  tolerated. 
Mongolia,  Manchuria  and  Tibet  are  integral  parts 
of  China’s  territory.  No  attempt  at  either  luring 
them  away  from  China  or  exercising  special  influ- 
ence over  them  should  be  permitted. 

China  wants  her  political  independence  respect- 
fully observed.  The  notorious  Twenty-One  De- 
mands and  the  malicious  treaties  that  Japan  forced 
China  to  accept  must  be  made  null  and  void.  The 
entity  of  China’s  jurisdiction  must  be  restored.  Ex- 
traterritoriality now  existing  in  China  should  be 
relinquished  gradually,  if  not  immediately.  For- 


6o 


eign  garrisons  stationed  at  various  places  of  China 
should  be  recalled.  Foreign  post  offices  in  China 
should  be  closed.  China  must  have  absolute  free- 
dom in  her  financial  affairs.  The  conventional  tariff 
now  in  force  in  China  should  be  removed.  Politi- 
cal stipulations  should  not  be  allowed  in  contract- 
ing any  loan  between  China  and  other  powers,  for 
whatever  purposes.  Boxer  Indemnity  which  was 
exacted  from  China  far  beyond  the  actual  injuries 
done  to  foreign  powers  should  be  cancelled.  China’s 
army  and  navy  represent  China’s  sovereignty.  No 
nation  should  be  allowed  to  get  control  of  them. 

These  major  claims  of  China  aim  at  nothing  but 
the  restoration  of  her  complete  sovereignty  and 
independence  which  she  is  morally  and  legally 
entitled  to.  Unless  the  Far  Eastern  status  is  radi- 
cally revised  by  the  enlightened  powers  now  gather- 
ing at  Paris,  the  League  of  Nations  will  be  only  a 
dream.  Unless  “Spheres  of  Influence”  and  “Bal- 
ance of  Powers”  are  done  away  with,  the  permanent 
peace  of  the  world  will  not  be  in  sight.  Unless  all 
the  wrongs  done  to  China  in  the  past  are  one  and 
all  righted,  the  happiness  of  mankind  would  never 
be  realized. 

In  reply  tq  the  question  asked  by  the  Peking 
correspondent  of  The  New  York  Times,  Why  did 
China  endorse  the  League?  Premier  Chien  Neng- 
Hsun  said,  “There  are  two  considerations.  First 
China  believes  in  the  establishment  of  justice  and 
right  throughout  the  world,  and,  second,  China  her- 
self feels  that  she  may  expect  the  world  to  apply 
these  principles  to  her  own  problems.”  In  an  inter- 
view with  the  some  correspondent,  Pi;esident  Hsu 
Shih-Chang  said,  “If  unfortunately  the  League  of 


6i 


Nations  fails  to  become  a fact,  the  result  will  not 
only  be  that  the  world’s  aspiration  will  remain 
unrealized,  but  that  the  Far  East  may  become  the 
first  region  dangerously  affected.”  These  words  of 
Premier  Chien  and  President  Hsu  voice  the  senti- 
ment of  all  China.  China  endorses  the  League  with 
full  expectation  and  faith,  will  the  other  members 
of  the  League  do  full  justice  to  her? 


62 


Address  all  communications  to 

Mr.  K.  P.  Wang 

(Secretary  of  the  Committee) 


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